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Although the idea that a violation of deeply held moral and ethical values can 
result in a profound psychic, social and spiritual wounding is an ancient one, the 
exploration of the phenomenon of moral injury in the field of mental health has only 
recently gained traction. Moral injury is increasingly being regarded as its own 
psychological phenomenon, one that shares symptomology with PTSD, but is also 
distinct, and as yet not sufficiently accounted for in current PTSD criteria. This 
theoretical thesis charts the evolving clinical construct of moral injury and draws on two 
bodies of theory, narrative theory and adult onset trauma theory, to further explore the 
psychic and social sequelae of war trauma. The work of the public health project Theater 
of War, and the text of Sophocles’ Ajax are used as case examples to illustrate the 
treatment implications for social work practice of applying narrative theory and adult 
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On a warm, late April evening this past spring, the actors Reg E. Cathey and Erica 
Newhouse sat on folding chairs in front of an audience at Amherst College.  On the table before 
them were microphones, water bottles, and scripts of Sophocles’ Ajax. Standing to their side was 
Bryan Doerries, the artistic director of Theater of War, a New York City-based social impact 
company that presents dramatic readings of classical texts followed by town hall discussions in 
order to raise awareness about the devastating effects of war on the human psyche. The 
performance at Amherst was Theater of War’s 299th, and they have thus far reached over 40,000 
military members and veterans around the country (Outside the Wire, 2015). The organization 
considers itself a public health project and sees damming this country’s current flood of military 
suicides, which has more than doubled since Operation Enduring Freedom began in 2001, as part 
of its mission (Outside the Wire, 2015; Bryan, Bryan, Morrow, Etienne, & Ray-Sannerud, 2014). 
Before the reading began, Doerries set the contextual stage for the audience, explaining 
that this was the tenth year of the Trojan War, and that Ajax, who would kill himself in the 
second act of the play, had recently suffered grave betrayal at the hands of his commanding 
officers. At issue: the armor of slain Achilles, the greatest of all Greek warriors, had been 
bestowed upon Odysseus, rather than the more deserving Ajax. Reeling from the wound of non-
recognition, not to mention the mental disorganization of a decade of combat, Ajax, Doerries 
told the audience, enters a berserk state and slaughters the animals in his compound, thinking 
that they are Odysseus and his men. Doerries then took a seat at the table (he would be reading 
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Odysseus’ lines) and Newhouse, instantly in character as Tecmessa, Ajax’s grief-stricken wife, 
began to tell of Ajax’s carnage—both literal and psychological: 
I can’t tell you what happened out there,  
But he returned dragging tethered bulls,  
Herdsmen’s dogs and captured sheep.  
He slit the throats of some; others he hung up 
And butchered cleaving them in two.  
The rest were tied up and tortured 
As if they were men, not livestock. … 
Then suddenly he came storming back inside.  
Slowly and painfully he returned to his senses.  
And when he saw the carnage under his roof,  
He grasped his head and screamed,  
Crashing down onto the bloody wreckage,  
Then just sitting in the slaughter, fists clenched, 
His nails tearing into his hair.  (Sophocles, 2007, 295-310) 
For the next two hours, some of the nuances of what I see as Ajax’s moral injury—the 
acts of betrayal and the acts of perpetration that can cause it; the states of shame, guilt, rage, and 
suicidality that it can induce—were held aloft. Together, the audience, the actors, and Doerries 
explored just how much a Greek tragedy written nearly twenty-five hundred years ago has to say 
to us about the present-day experience of veterans and their families, be those veterans of the 
Vietnam War or the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As just a brief example, Tecmessa’s 
description of Ajax in a berserk state, slaughtering animals he believes are men, has an uncanny 
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echo in the descriptions of the My Lai massacre that took place in Vietnam in 1968. Robert Jay 
Lifton (1973), in his seminal work on the war, noted that some eyewitness accounts had 
American troops  
gunning down the Vietnamese with “no expression on . . . [their] faces . . .very 
businesslike,” with “breaks for cigarettes or refreshments.” Yet others described 
the men as having become “wild” or “crazy” in their killing, raping, and 
destroying. The My Lai survivor described one GI engaging in a “mad chase” 
after a pig, which he eventually bayoneted; and others in uncontrolled ways, 
tossing grenades or firing powerful weapons into the fragile “hootches” that made 
up the village. (p. 51) 
The mechanism of dehumanization—or conditioning, as the American military calls it—
is what allows human beings to override their innate aversion to killing other human beings 
(Milgram, 1974; Grossman, 2009; Smith, 2011). There is, of course, a continuum of acts 
committed in war, ranging from the just to the atrocious. But whether a service member is 
ordered to use deadly force to stop a teenager suspected of wearing a bomb from approaching a 
military base, or witnesses the shrieking grief of an eight-year-old boy who has just seen his 
mother shot in the face by American troops, or, in a moment of collective rage, terror, and 
traumatic grief, as Lifton (1973) believes the troops at My Lai were propelled by, confuses pigs 
with human beings and human beings with pigs, a fundamental transgression—a moral injury—
has occurred. “The telling truth,” notes the humanities scholar Robert Meagher (2014),  
is that a great many combat veterans are haunted more by what they have done 
than by what they have endured in war…. ‘Kicking ass’ does not include facing 
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the possibility that all killing kills something in the killer and that, as a result, 
there is no such thing as killing without dying. (p. xviii) 
For thousands of years, writers, artists, philosophers, historians, and of course combat 
veterans have recognized moral injury as a state of being, but only in the last five hundred years 
have the psychological sequelae of war been explicitly named. According to Tick (2005), the 
cluster of symptoms soldiers seemed to commonly experience post-battle were first diagnosed by 
Swiss doctors in 1678 and called nostalgia. During the Civil War, the psychic effects of war 
were referred to as soldiers’ heart, and in World War I as shell shock. In World War II and the 
Korean War, soldiers were thought to suffer from combat fatigue, and in the post Vietnam-era, 
the term posttraumatic stress was introduced. Now moral injury is being viewed as a valid and 
valuable construct within the clinical scientific community and beyond (Litz et al., 2009; Nash & 
Litz 2013; Morris, 2015). It is in the early stages of being operationalized—a complicated task, 
given how individual and perhaps fundamentally unquantifiable moral injury may be (Vargas et 
al. 2013; Kinghorn, 2012).  
Jonathan Shay (1994, 2014), a psychiatrist who over the last twenty years has worked 
extensively with Vietnam veterans and has authored two seminal texts on the subject, is credited 
with first coining the phrase moral injury in the late 1990s and embedding it in the mental health 
lexicon (Litz et al., 2009; Kinghorn; 2012; Nash & Litz 2013,). Shay’s most current (2014) 
definition of moral injury is the following:  
 A betrayal of what’s right. 
 By someone who holds legitimate authority (e.g. the military—a leader). 
 In a high stakes situation.  
All three.  (p. 183) 
 
 5 
The Department of Veterans Affairs-based psychologist Brett Litz and his colleagues picked up 
this understanding of moral injury in 2009 and have expanded the definition for service members 
and veterans, offering additional nuance and empirically supported clinical texture to include the 
idea that the betrayer of what’s right does not have to be “someone who holds authority” but can 
also, devastatingly, be oneself. Nash & Litz (2013) state that moral injury can be seen as  
the enduring consequences of perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, 
or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations. 
Central to the concept of moral injury is an event that is not only inconsistent with 
previous moral expectations, but which has the power to negate them. Moral 
injury is not merely a state of cognitive dissonance, but a state of loss of trust in 
previously deeply held beliefs about one’s own or others’ ability to keep our 
shared moral covenant. (p. 368)  
Betrayal—by others or by oneself—is the common denominator of these two conceptions 
of moral injury, and in each case, shame, guilt, and self-destructive behaviors are the signature 
after-effects. The broader scope of symptomology includes social withdrawal, anger, anhedonia 
and dysphoria, avoidance, change or loss in spirituality and/or meaning in life, and negative 
changes in ethical attitudes and behavior (Drescher et al., 2011; Gray et al., 2012; Nash & Litz, 
2013; Bryan et al., 2014). It is worth noting that in the moral injury model that Nash & Litz 
(2013) have put forth,  
intense anger and impulses to seek revenge are central in moral injuries resulting 
from others’ acts or failures to act that seem to violate communally shared moral 
values, and these emotions and cognitions are maintained through an inability to 
forgive perceived perpetrators. (p. 369) 
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We are thus back to Ajax and his particular feedback loop of moral injury: vengeful, homicidal 
rage toward Odysseus, which leads to unsurvivable shame and guilt.   
 On September 20th, 2015, The New York Times ran a front page story entitled “A Unit 
Stalked by Suicide, Trying to Save Itself,” in which the reporter, David Philipps, describes the 
post-deployment death and despair encountered by veterans of the Second Battalion, Seventh 
Marine Regiment, who served a harrowing, combat-filled stint in Afghanistan in 2008. As 
Philipps reports, of the 1,200 Marines who were there in 2008, at least 13 have since committed 
suicide.  In addition to detailing the lack of adequate mental health care from the Department of 
Veterans Affairs, Philipps, through the voices of the Marines, evokes the often lethal psychic 
collapse that occurs for those who have killed or seen others killed in combat—and outlines just 
how intractable a crisis this has proven to be. As Philipps notes,  
For years leaders at the top level of the government have acknowledged the high 
suicide rate among veterans and spent heavily to try to reduce it. But the suicides 
have continued, and basic questions about who is most at risk and how best to 
help them are still largely unanswered. (Philipps, 2015) 
This thesis takes as its starting point the reality that the psychological state of our recent 
combat veterans is dire. Because clinical social workers are often on the front lines of psychic 
defense for these men and women, it is urgent that we continue to research, to theorize, and to 
disseminate information about war trauma. The evolving construct of moral injury is, in my 
mind, a highly worthy attempt to do just that. Since Litz et al.’s (2009) call to operationalize 
moral injury, a growing number of psychologists (many based at the Department of Veterans 
Affairs and grounded in cognitive behavorial theory) have responded to that challenge. This 
thesis will review their contributions. I will begin by laying out some of the current factors that 
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have brought the urgency of understanding and conceptualizing moral injury to the fore, and 
chart some of the key ways in which it has evolved from past conceptualizations of post-
traumatic stress disorder. In reviewing the clinical literature, I will offer more detailed 
descriptions of the primary causal and resultant mechanisms of moral injury—perpetration, guilt, 
and shame—as well as describe some of the burgeoning models for moral repair.  
I will apply concepts of narrative theory and practice from the work of Michael White in 
order to better understand the dominant—and psychically damaging—storylines that exist 
around war and veterans. I will also apply concepts of adult onset trauma theory from the work 
of Ghislaine Boulanger in order to better understand the unconscious processes and 
psychodynamic implications of moral injury. Because Theater of War’s public health project 
functions as an iteration of narrative practice, this thesis will also specifically consider the 
treatment implications of Theater of War for moral injury, as well as the clinical revelations that 
Sophocles’ Ajax offers with regard to the moral injury construct.   
Narrative theory and practice, which developed out of various disciplines, including 
anthropology, sociology, and social psychology, take as their starting point the notion that human 
beings create narratives to make sense of their lives, narratives that are constitutive of 
experience. From a narrative perspective, human beings are often over-influenced by dominant 
narratives and lose touch with—or are never permitted to recognize in the first place—
alternative, de-pathologizing storylines that are more in keeping with their actual lived 
experience. Narrative practice, which takes a de-centered approach, seeks to aid people in 
locating their own preferred narratives through uncovering and thereby externalizing dominant 
historical, social, and intra-personal narratives. As White (2007) notes, such externalizing allows 
for “objectification of the problem against cultural practices of objectification of people” (p. 9). 
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Narrative theory and practice is particularly well-suited to social work practice as it is a mode of 
therapeutic inquiry that seeks to uncover the “politics of the problem…the power relations that 
people have been subject to and that have shaped their negative conclusions about their life and 
their identity” (p. 27). It is a therapeutic practice that is always highly attuned to the forces in 
society that dominate, discriminate, and exploit.  
Adult onset trauma theory, which the psychoanalyst and scholar Ghislaine Boulanger, 
formulates in her book, Wounded by Reality (2009), is located within a relational framework and 
offers a compelling perspective on what happens to the adult self when it is confronted with 
catastrophic trauma. According to Boulanger, such trauma shatters the self’s ability to reflect, 
symbolize, connect to a sense of a historic self, and retain access to internal and external others. 
Her theory is particularly concerned with the crucial distinctions in the dissociative processes 
between adult onset trauma and developmental trauma, and the further injury that can occur 
when these distinctions are conflated or misunderstood. Her understanding of adult onset trauma 
has valuable implications for the treatment of individuals experiencing moral injury. Not only 
does it delineate the sequelae of the shattering of an adult self and challenge long-held 
psychoanalytic notions about “the durability of psychic structure” (p. 12), but it also breaks from 
the classical psychoanalytic tendency to view adult reactions to external events as driven 
exclusively by the individual’s developmental history and particular object relations. Boulanger 
takes issue with the notion that the adult survivor of adult onset-trauma can be reduced only to 
“psychic infancy” (p. 96). Instead, she gives deserved weight to the reality of the catastrophic 
event(s) encountered in adulthood, a crucial stance for social workers confronted with moral 
injury and the particular horrors of war.  
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At the same time, Boulanger conceives of adult onset trauma theory from within a 
relational framework—she does not throw out the baby, so to speak, with the bathwater—and I 
also believe it is crucial to examine moral injury from a psychodynamic perspective, to conceive 
of it in relation to our conscious and unconscious processes, to our methods of psychic defense, 
and to our object relations with self and other. Finally, adult onset trauma theory offers a useful 
counterpoint to the cognitive behavioral orientation of most of the moral injury construct 
builders in the clinical scientific community, and thus provides additional intellectual space in 
which to conceptualize moral injury and consider how best to treat it.  
 
Conclusion  
Philip Klay, a veteran of the war in Iraq and the author of Redeployment, a National Book 
Award-winning collection of stories, made a plea last year in a New York Times opinion piece for 
there to be a greater willingness in this country to enter into a collective conversation about the 
psychic costs of war: 
If we fetishize trauma as incommunicable then survivors are trapped — unable to 
feel truly known by their nonmilitary friends and family. . . . If the past 10 years 
have taught us anything, it’s that in the age of an all-volunteer military, it is far 
too easy for Americans to send soldiers on deployment after deployment without 
making a serious effort to imagine what that means. (Klay, 2014)  
The aim of this thesis is to present a picture of moral injury as it is currently being 
constructed by the clinical scientific community, and to then both enhance and complicate this 
picture by examining the phenomenon of moral injury through the lenses of narrative theory and 
adult onset trauma theory. Like Klay, I want to broaden the ways in which the trauma of war can 
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be communicated. I see the current moral injury construct as one form of communication; I see 
Theater of War’s readings of Ajax as another, and I see a psychodynamic understanding of what 
happens to a person’s mind when he or she is faced with the reality of human beings killing other 
human beings as yet another. None of these modes of communication are incompatible with the 
others, and indeed, finding lines of connection between cognitive behavioral theory and 
psychodynamic theory, between theater and social work, between ancient literature and present 
day military experience—not to mention between civilians and service members—is crucial to 
this endeavor. I should add too that finding ways to communicate the incommunicable is 
different from absolute knowing. I, as a civilian social worker, will never fully know what it is 
like to experience war trauma. But I can listen, and in true listening there is true communication, 
and therefore true human recognition. As the Norwegian social psychiatrist Tom Anderson once 







The Phenomenon of Moral Injury 
 
 




Early on, before they’d seen any real action, Billy asked him what being in a 
firefight was like. Shroom thought for a moment. “It’s not like anything, except 
maybe being raped by angels.” He’d say, “I love you” to every man in the squad 
before rolling out, say it straight, with no joking or smart-ass lilt and no warbly 
Christian smarm in it either, just that brisk declaration like he was tightening the 
seat belts around everyone’s soul.  




Over two and a half million service members have deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq 
since 2001, and their acute psychological needs have given rise to a fresh awareness within the 
government as well as within the fields of mental health to the ways in which warfare damages 
minds (RAND, 2015; Sherman, 2015).  
This damage is thought to be compounded by the nature of our recent conflicts in the 
Middle East: counterinsurgency and urban guerrilla warfare may be especially conducive to 
producing traumatic, morally injurious situations due to their unconventional aspects, such as the 
difficulty of differentiating civilians from combatants (Litz et al., 2009). What’s more, the 
multiple deployments that are required of a voluntary military—less than one percent of the 
American population has served in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—are exponentially taxing 
the emotional well-being of service members and families who must then navigate multiple 
disruptions, losses, and sacrifices (Meagher, 2014). Indeed, as Litz et al. (2009) point out, 
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deployment length has been correlated with an increase in unethical behaviors within the first ten 
months of deployment.  
The suffering is undeniable. The Department of Veteran Affairs estimates that roughly 
8,000 veterans kill themselves a year, which translates to a rate of about twenty-two per day—or 
one every 65 minutes (Department of Veterans Affairs, 2012, as cited in Doerries, 2015, p. 4). 
According to Nazarov et al. (2015), while sixty percent of all veterans committing suicide are 
fifty years of age or older—a reflection of how much of the overall veteran population is 
represented by those who served in Vietnam or Korea—in 2012, the most common cause of 
death in personnel who were currently serving in the US military was not combat (311 deaths) 
but suicide (349 deaths and 915 attempts). Since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began fourteen 
years ago, the number of suicides among active duty personnel has doubled (Nazarov et al., 
2015; Kinghorn, 2012; U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2012; U.S. Department of Defense, 
2011).  
Roughly twenty percent of service members coming home from the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan meet the criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and thus suffer from a 
debilitating symptomology that includes flashbacks, intrusive memories, nightmares, emotional 
and inter-relational avoidance, isolating, anger, hypervigilance, self-destructive behaviors, 
especially substance abuse, and negative alterations in cognition and mood (Nazarov et al., 2015, 
Department of Veterans Affairs 2015; DSM-5, 2013; Kinghorn, 2012; Rauch et al., 2010). While 
PTSD is the most prominent diagnosis among returning troops, there is also, as Rauch et al. 
(2010) note, a clear association with anxiety, depression (as cited by Hoge et al., 2004), 
substance abuse (as cited by Jacobson et al. 2008), physical health problems (as cited by 
Gironda, Clark, & Walker, 2005 and Hoge et al., 2007), aggression (as cited by Jacupac et al., 
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2007), risk-taking behavior (as cited by Killgore et al., 2008), and suicide (as cited by Kuehn, 
2009).   
In an attempt to mitigate this mental health crisis, the federal government has directed a 
vast amount of funds towards understanding the etiology and treatment of PTSD: in 2012 alone, 
it spent three billion dollars on PTSD treatments (Nash & Litz, 2013; Morris, 2015). The 
Department of Veterans Affairs has two “gold-standard” evidence-based treatments (EBT) that it 
puts forward for anyone with a diagnosis of PTSD: Prolonged Exposure (PE) and Cognitive 
Processing Therapy (CPT) (Nash & Litz, 2013; Department of Veterans Affairs, 2015). And yet, 
with the number of combat veterans diagnosed with PTSD ever growing, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that these two widely used and heralded treatments are not sufficient. As 
Steenkamp & Litz (2014) recently stated, “individual CPT and PE work in that they reduce 
military-related PTSD symptoms. However, it is less clear whether PE and CPT work well, that 
is, decrease symptoms to the point of low impairment and distress. Across studies at least half of, 
but typically most veterans still meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD following treatment” (p. 706).  
While a comprehensive review of the etiology of PTSD is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
it will nonetheless be useful to contextualize its evolution within the field of trauma studies and 
the recent changes in its diagnostic criteria, so that we may better understand why moral injury is 
increasingly being regarded as its own psychological phenomenon, one that crucially shares 
symptomology with PTSD, but is also distinct and as yet not sufficiently accounted for in current 
PTSD criteria. As proponents of the moral injury construct argue, this lack of fit of moral injury 
within standard PTSD criteria accounts for precisely why PTSD treatments designed without a 
clear conception of moral injury are failing to reduce symptoms for so many combat veterans 




Posttraumatic stress disorder 
PTSD was officially introduced as a psychiatric diagnosis in the DSM-III in 1980 (APA), 
marking a crucial paradigm shift in the field of mental health by sanctioning the belief that the 
stressor for the experienced psychic anguish and symptomology existed outside the person—i.e., 
in the form of a traumatic event, like a car accident, a rape, a natural disaster or combat—rather 
than inside the person, in the form of an intrapsychic neurosis. With this first official iteration, 
PTSD was categorized as an anxiety disorder, and the criteria indicated that the external 
traumatic event needed to be directly life threatening. That external event—the index trauma—
would then come to dominate the consciousness of survivors, as they entered a cycle of re-
experiencing via nightmares, intrusive thoughts, and full-blown sensory flashbacks, and found 
themselves unable to experience pleasure or vitality in their present life (van der Kolk & van der 
Hart, 1991; van der Kolk, 2003; Department of Veterans Affairs, 2015). Indeed, the concerns 
and attachments of present life—along with the concerns and attachments of family members 
and friends—can fade frighteningly in the face of what Boulanger (2007) calls “the momentous 
and very private experiences” the survivor is continually reliving (p. 7).  
The idea of external traumatic events returning to the trauma survivor in this way was not 
new. As van der Kolk (2003) delineates, in one extraordinarily trauma-attuned decade at the end 
of the nineteenth century, first Charcot (1887), then Janet (1919), and finally Freud (1925) 
explored the metabolization (or lack thereof) of trauma, pinpointing the processes of 
dissociation, unbidden re-experiencing, and fragmentation of memory that today are integral 
parts of our understanding of trauma. Freud then famously came to disavow the reality of his 
patients’ experiences of trauma, turning psychoanalysis toward the intrapsychic. At that point, as 
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van der Kolk (2003) succinctly puts it, “Real-life trauma was ignored in favor of fantasy” (p. 
176).  
Through the process of what Herman (1992) calls “episodic amnesia” (p. 7), the study of 
trauma was largely ignored after Freud’s reversal until the beginning of World War II, when 
Kardner (1941), in an account of the experience of treating World War I veterans, wrote that  
[the] subject acts as if the original traumatic situation were still in existence and 
engages in protective devices which failed on the original occasion. This means in 
effect that his conception of the outer world and his conception of himself have 
been permanently altered. (p. 82; emphasis added) 
After World War II the study of trauma was again split off, like a dissociated self state, from the 
core self of psychoanalysis, and did not reemerge again until the psychic suffering of Vietnam 
veterans reached a saturation point in the early 1970s and the American public had no choice but 
to listen to their stories and reconsider the way they were seen, heard, and treated (Herman, 
1992; van der Kolk, 2003). As an intern at the Department of Veteran Affairs this past year, I sat 
in on a Vietnam Veterans’ support group and had the privilege of witnessing the pride and sense 
of agency a number of these veterans had for the key role that Vietnam veterans played in 
advocating for the inclusion of PTSD as we now know it in the DSM—and their awareness of 
how much recent veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan have benefited as a result. Understandably, 
this pride was accompanied by bitterness and anger, for there was no such diagnosis available for 
them when they came home.  
The psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton (1973) was a key figure in raising national awareness 
of the trauma experienced by Vietnam veterans and can also be considered an early architect of 
the currently evolving construct of moral injury. While he did not use that term, he wrote 
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extensively on the sequelae of combat experiences, particularly the effect that killing in combat 
could have on an individual’s psychic landscape. He was also interested in the emotional and 
contextual elements that could line up to create what he called “atrocity producing situations” (p. 
41) whereby “one had to be a bit exceptional or, in that situation, ‘abnormal,’ in order to avoid 
taking part in slaughter” (p. 57).  
Renewed interest in trauma stemming from the Vietnam War, the women’s movement, 
and the relational turn in psychoanalysis—which rigorously addressed the realities of sexual 
abuse in childhood (Herman, 1992; Davies & Frawley, 1994; Bromberg, 1998; Boulanger 
2007)—resulted in a wave of research on the interplay of attachment and neurobiology with 
trauma. According to van der Kolk (2003), PTSD has since come to be regarded as a 
“physioneurosis”: a “mental disorder based on the persistence of biological emergency 
responses” (p. 177).  Research has demonstrated how traumatic experiences can impact the 
regulatory and integrative capacities of brain function—namely the brain stem and 
hypothalamus, the limbic system, and the neocortex—and decrease the brain’s capacity to 
respond adaptively to external events (Siegel & Solomon, 2003). It appears that permanent 
neural changes can occur when the central nervous system is overly stimulated at the time of the 
trauma, thus impacting a person’s ability to evaluate future stimuli; the smell of burning toast, 
for example, may trigger an emergency physiological response that would in actuality be 
appropriate if the entire house were on fire (van der Kolk, 2003). This same difficulty with 
processes of categorization may account for the way in which entire episodes of traumatic 
experience are held in the mind: not in a narrative fashion, but rather in sensory-loaded 
fragments. As van der Kolk (2003) notes,  
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While most patients with PTSD construct a narrative of their trauma over time, it 
is characteristic of PTSD that sensory elements of the trauma itself continue to 
intrude as flashbacks and nightmares, altered states of consciousness in which the 
trauma is relived, unintegrated with an overall sense of self. Because traumatic 
memories are so fragmented, it seems reasonable to postulate that extreme 
emotional arousal leads to a failure of the central nervous system to synthesize the 
sensations related to the trauma into an integrated whole. (p. 180)  
The relevance of human attachment systems to trauma was first made manifest in Judith 
Herman’s conception of “complex posttraumatic disorders” (Herman, 1992). According to 
Herman, individuals who suffer repeated traumas at a developmentally vulnerable stage—i.e., in 
early childhood or adolescence, when the brain is undergoing significant neurological changes—
experience an array of aftereffects. As Courtois & Ford (2009) point out,  
identifying complex trauma as a distinct subset of psychological traumas provides 
the clinician and researcher with a basis for identifying individuals who have 
experienced not only the shock of extreme fear, helplessness, and horror but also 
disruption of the emergent capacity for psychobiological self-regulation and 
secure attachment. In addition to hyperarousal and hypervigilance in relation to 
external danger, complex trauma poses for the person the internal threat of being 
unable to self-regulate, self-organize, or draw upon relationships to regain self-
integrity. (p. 17)  
Although complex PTSD was rejected as a separate diagnosis in the DSM IV, it has, in 
multiple and ongoing ways, expanded the clinical understanding of trauma and inspired 
clinicians and researchers to more rigorously consider the impact of chronicity—on a child who 
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is sexually abused over a period of years, for example, or on the effects of ‘cumulative adversity’ 
due to poverty, racism, genocide, intellectual disabilities, sexual harassment/assault in the work 
place, or exposure to suffering or death (Courtois & Ford, 2009; Vogt, King, & King, 2007). 
Along with looking at the salient effects of chronicity, researchers have also paid particular 
attention to the effects of closeness, i.e., the relational position of the trauma survivor to the 
person or entity that was traumatizing. Courtois & Ford (2009) state: 
The closer the relationship between perpetrators(s) and victim(s) and their group 
(e.g., in a family, religion, gender, political party, institution, chain of command), 
the more likely they are to face conditions of divided loyalty. As a self-protective 
strategy, the group may coalesce around silencing, secrecy, and denial…. This 
circumstance has been labeled the second injury (Symonds, 1975) or betrayal 
trauma (DePrince and Freyd, 2007). (p. 18) 
The thirteen years between the DSM-IV-TR (2000) and the DSM-5 (2013) saw much 
debate as to how trauma should be diagnosed and treated and what the core criteria of PTSD 
should ultimately be (Jones & Cureton 2014). The current definition of PTSD in the DSM-5 
(2013) incorporates some of the ideas that are contained within the various formulations and 
comorbidities of complex PTSD and makes some notable revisions, although it arguably still 
does not fully do justice to the nuances of complex PTSD. Most importantly, PTSD is no longer 
in the category of Anxiety Disorders, but now serves as the foundational diagnosis of the new 
Trauma-and-Stressor-Related category. Criterion A for a diagnosis is exposure to actual or 
threatened death, serious injury, or (this is newly included) sexual violence. Recurrent exposure 
to traumatic events and/or details, also known as vicarious traumatization, is also newly 
included. Greater emphasis has been placed on the phenomenon of avoidance in relation to 
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PTSD, such that it now has its own cluster of symptomology. The four clusters are: intrusion, 
avoidance, negative alterations in cognition and mood, and negative alterations in arousal and 
reactivity. Three new symptoms were also included: persistent or distorted blame of self or 
others, a persistent negative emotional state, and reckless or destructive behavior (Department of 
Veterans Affairs, 2015). These new symptoms have important ramifications for expanding the 
diagnosis to include individuals—like combat veterans suffering moral injury—whose primary 
response in the face of a traumatic experience may not just be fear, helplessness, or horror, but 
also guilt, shame, or numbness (Jones & Cureton, 2014). 
Despite such amendments to the definition of PTSD in the DSM-5, Jones & Cureton 
(2014), in reviewing the extant literature, are not convinced that the current diagnosis of PTSD 
sufficiently describes the array of symptomology experienced by early childhood survivors of 
abuse (Herman, 1992; van der Kolk, 2003, van der Kolk et al., 2005). Moreover, as previously 
mentioned, a growing number of researchers do not find that it fully encompasses the 
symptomology of some combat veterans, insofar as the DSM-5 continues to dictate that the 
stressor event must be one that invokes a fear response (Nash & Litz, 2013). Fear as a primary 
causal agent of PTSD (and therefore fear as the primary response to be extinguished through 
treatment) is what much of the recent research on moral injury calls into question (Gray et al., 
2012). 
In conclusion, it is worth underscoring how conceptualizations of PTSD have been 
marked by a kind of theoretical seismic activity: by reversals, by abandonment, and by 
disagreement. Citing Brewin, Lanius, Novac, Schnyder, & Galea (2009), Jones & Cureton 
(2014) state that “with the exception of dissociative identity disorder, no other diagnostic 
condition in the history of the DSM has created more controversy about boundaries of the 
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condition, symptomological profile, central assumptions, clinical utility and prevalence than 
PTSD.” Nash & Litz (2009) also take note of the ongoing confusion around the criteria for 
PTSD. “Despite more than three decades of research and multiple revisions of the diagnostic 
criteria for PTSD,” they write, “it remains unclear what stressor types are capable of inducing 
posttraumatic stress symptoms, and how directly and immediately they must be experienced” (p. 
367).  
Indeed, in a post 9/11 era, the very phenomenon of PTSD can seem increasingly difficult 
to ground and examine. On the one hand, there is the clinical conceptualization of this disorder; 
on the other, there is the culture’s incorporation of it. PTSD is everywhere. At a recent forum at 
Smith College, Edward Tick (2015) called it, only half-jokingly, “posttraumatic societal 
disorder.” His meaning is that, at least with regard to combat veterans, our culture does an 
exceedingly poor job of recognizing and healing the after-effects of war; the problem, he 
believes, is less with veteran symptomology than with a society that cannot look directly at what 
it sanctions. According to the journalist and combat veteran David Morris (2014),  
We live now in an aftermath culture, a culture where being traumatized is 
presumed to be the appropriate response to just about any overwhelming event…. 
[PTSD] has become a sort of global lingua franca, a label, an identity, a way of 
understanding the self, a cultural meme, a political interest group, a scientific 
mythology, and even a theory of time. (p. 15; p. 20) 
Part of what is driving the current proponents of moral injury—and accounts for the undeniable 
energy and sense of urgency in this field of research—is the need to section off moral injury, to 
pull the bio-psycho-social sequelae of combat away from a generalized, diluted, even 
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stereotypical understanding of PTSD and into the realm of the specific, where authentic 
understanding and repair can flourish.  
 
Defining the Moral Injury Construct 
Shay (1994), as noted, is credited with having initiated the current conversation on moral 
injury. In Achilles in Vietnam, he compares the trials of Homer’s warriors to the experiences of 
Vietnam veterans and challenges the notion that veterans suffer from a post-traumatic disorder. 
The psychological after-effects of combat, he insists, should not be viewed as a disorder, but 
rather as moral injury, as real as a leg amputation, and as such should move away from the 
pathological. Shay (1994) is openly indebted to Herman’s (1992) formulations of trauma, and 
comes to the conclusion that experiencing a “betrayal of what’s right” by those in command is 
the key precipitant for a soldier enduring lasting psychological wounds, in part because of the 
way that such betrayals mimic developmental betrayals and victimizations. The social trust that 
is destroyed by such a breach, Shay (1994) theorizes, creates a persistence of combat-readiness 
(i.e., hypervigilance), betrayal (which he sees evidence of in the high rates of homelessness of 
Vietnam veterans), isolation (destroyed trust in others), a sense of meaninglessness, and 
suicidality (169-80).  
In 2005, Ed Tick helped to alert the mental health community to the ways in which PTSD 
as an all-encompassing diagnosis was failing veterans. In particular, he called attention to the 
“soul wound” (p. 7) of many combat soldiers and lamented the absence of cultural rituals for 
returning veterans, who, he believes, need the community’s support to make the transition from 
veteran to warrior in order to heal. While he does not use the term moral injury, that is 
nonetheless precisely what he is talking about. After a decade of treating veterans through 
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conventional models of therapy and witnessing little true improvement, Tick turned to the rituals 
of past cultures and explored the benefits of alternative methods of healing, including 
“purification, storytelling, healing journeys, grieving rituals, meetings with former enemies, soul 
retrieval, initiation ceremonies, and the creation and nurturing of a warrior class” (p. 5). The 
pathway to healing, he came to believe, “must deal with our moral and spiritual dimensions” (p. 
6).  
Four years later, Litz et al.’s (2009) empirically supported theoretical study was 
published, and true operationalization of moral injury began. Because of this multifaceted 
study’s influence in paving the way for moral injury to be considered a legitimate clinical 
construct—one worthy of government funding—I will spend some time outlining it. 
Litz et al. (2009) begin by theorizing what might be morally injurious in war and 
identifying some of the primary morally questionable situations that can arise for combat 
soldiers, e.g., accidentally taking the life of a civilian, being directly responsible for killing an 
enemy, viewing dead bodies or human remains, and the viewing of injured or distraught women 
or children whom a soldier is powerless to help. In order to highlight the grave psychic 
consequences of perpetration, Litz et al. (2009) then provide an overview of the extant research 
on mental health in the aftermath of military atrocities, which they define as “unnecessary, cruel, 
and abusive harm to others or lethal violence and killing” (p. 697). The salient points drawn from 
this body of research are worth summarizing:  
1.  For Vietnam veterans with chronic PTSD, the connection between 
committing an atrocity and suffering from PTSD was much stronger than from 
simply participating in combat (as cited in Yehuda, Southwick, & Giller, 1992; 
Fontana et al., 1992). 
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2.  Exposure to atrocities correlates with a higher risk of depression and 
suicidality (as cited in Hiley-Young, Blake, Abueg, Rozynko, & Gusman, 1995).  
3. Killing in any situation (i.e. committing an atrocity or killing under basic 
orders and/or self defense) is more highly associated with chronic PTSD than other 
combat experiences (as cited in Fontana & Rosenheck, 1999; MacNair, 2002). 
4. Among Iraq War veterans, taking another life is a significant predictor of 
PTSD symptoms, alcohol abuse, anger, and relationship difficulties (as cited in 
Maguen et al., 2010). 
5. Veterans with greater levels of combat exposure are more likely to seek 
services from the VA because of guilt and loss of faith rather than PTSD or lack of 
social support (as cited in Fontana & Rosenheck, 2004).  
6. Active roles related to killing (defined as being an agent or failing to 
prevent killing) point to greater PTSD and suicide than other more passive roles 
(as cited in Fontana et al., 1992).  
Litz et al. (2009) conclude, on the basis of this research literature, that perpetration—killing or 
committing atrocities—is clearly linked to elevated levels of distress and avoidance symptoms.  
Litz et al. (2009) then establish the schema-driven social-cognitive foundation upon 
which they are building their moral injury construct:   
Similar to social-cognitive theories of PTSD, we argue that moral injury involves 
an act of transgression that creates dissonance and conflict because it violates 
assumptions and beliefs about right and wrong and personal goodness. If 
individuals are unable to assimilate or accommodate (integrate) the event within 
existing self-and-relational schemas, they will experience guilt, shame, and 
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anxiety about potential dire personal consequences (e.g., ostracization). Poor 
integration leads to lingering psychological distress, due to frequent intrusions, 
and avoidance behaviors tend to thwart successful accommodation. (p. 698) 
In defining the basic concepts necessary for a formulation of moral injury, Litz et al. (2009) cite 
morals, moral emotions, and self-forgiveness. They define morals as “the personal and shared 
familial, cultural, societal and legal rules for social behavior, either tacit or explicit,” and as 
“fundamental assumptions about how things work and how one should behave in the world” (p. 
699). Moral emotions, they state are “both self-focused and other-focused, [and] serve to 
maintain a moral code. Morality-related emotions are driven by expectations of others’ responses 
to perceived transgression” (p. 699).  
As they note, the bulk of research on negative moral emotions has thus far focused on 
shame and guilt, and clearly suggests that shame, which involves a wholesale condemnation of 
the self, is more destructive than guilt, which primarily involves self-condemnation in relation to 
a specific act or transgression (Tangney and Dearing, 2002). (A more in-depth discussion of the 
role of shame and guilt in moral injury will follow.) 
After defining these basic concepts, Litz et al. (2009) are then able to fully present their 
conceptual model of moral injury, which, as previously mentioned, they see as the direct result of 
committing, failing to prevent, witnessing, or learning about acts that violate deeply held moral 
beliefs. They state, “If the service members feel remorse about various behaviors, they will 
experience guilt; if they blame themselves because of perceived personal inadequacy and flaws, 
they will experience shame” (p. 700).  Both of these emotions, but shame especially, can lead to 
withdrawal and “concealment,” which will preempt opportunities to shift these new schemas 
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about the self and thus draw the service member farther and farther away from the possibility of 
“corrective” experiences and self-forgiveness (p. 700).  
In further assessing the relation of moral injury to PTSD, Litz et al. (2009) note the ways 
in which moral injury mirrors the symptoms of reexperiencing, avoidance, and emotional 
numbing that are at the heart of PTSD. They argue that the drive to make sense of the dissonant 
morally injurious experience leads to intrusive thoughts of the event(s) and that this re-
experiencing then leads to diminished self esteem, which leads in turn to numbing and avoidance 
behaviors, thereby foreclosing the opportunity for reaffirming experiences with others that might 
interrupt this feedback loop. They note that the most damaging outcome of moral injury is the 
“possibility of enduring changes in self and other beliefs that reflect regressive over-
accommodation of moral violation, culpability, or expectations of injustice” (p. 701). 
But they emphasize that current formulations of PTSD do not fully explain the evolution 
and after-effects of moral injury. In their view, theories of PTSD “attempt to explain the long-
term phenomenology of individuals harmed by others (and other unpredictable, uncontrollable, 
and threatening circumstances and have not considered the potential harm produced by 
perpetration (and moral transgressions) in traumatic contexts” (p. 699). In order to effect any 
type of repair, they argue, the moral emotions that follow acts of perpetration—shame and 
guilt—need to be exposed and then adjusted through self-forgiveness. They conclude by offering 
a preliminary eight-step cognitive-behavioral-based clinical care model and by exhorting fellow 
researchers to take a multi-disciplinary approach to further construction of moral injury, 






Validating the Moral Injury Construct 
With the goal of qualitative construct building, Drescher et al. (2011) gathered a diverse 
group of 23 chaplains, mental health clinicians, and researchers who had worked with combat 
and veteran populations for many years and used a semi-structured interview to evaluate the need 
for a working definition of moral injury. The unequivocal consensus was threefold: that morally 
injurious experiences did indeed occur in war, that these experiences could cause a variety of 
long-term psycho-spiritual-social-behavioral difficulties, and that the construct of moral injury 
was not sufficiently contained within PTSD criteria. Key areas of potentially morally injurious 
events were identified and have been used as the primary categories for morally injurious 
experiences in the literature since. These are betrayal (by leaders, peers, trusted civilians, or by 
oneself), disproportionate violence, incidents involving civilians, and within-ranks violence. The 
authors concluded by cautioning that before further quantitative research or clinical trials could 
move forward, the field needed to create a scale that could reliably and validly measure moral 
injury. 
Nash et al. (2013) devised the Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES) and administered it to 
533 active duty Marines following combat deployment. The scale used a Likert-type response 
option to gauge responses to nine items split into factors of 1) perceived transgressions by self or 
other, and 2) perceived betrayal of an other. The nine items are as follows: witnessing of acts of 
commission, distress resulting from others’ acts of commission, perpetration of acts of 
commission, distress due to acts of commission, perpetration of acts of omission, distress due to 
acts of omission, perceived betrayal by leaders, perceived betrayal by fellow service members, 
perceived betrayal by nonmilitary others. Nash et al. (2013) proceeded to rigorously test the scale 
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by evaluating its internal reliability, its psychometric properties, and its temporal stability, as 
well as by cross-validating the two-factor structure. They found that the MIES had “excellent 
internal consistency” and demonstrated temporal stability, and concluded that while further 
evaluation of the MIES with other branches of the military and with both genders was indicated, 
it was “a conceptually valid and psychometrically sound measure” (650). In further support of 
the moral injury model, Nash et al. (2013) found with the MIES scale that exposure to potentially 
morally injurious situations among these Marines correlated positively with depression, anxiety, 
and PTSD symptoms, and negatively with perceived interpersonal support.  
Bryan et al. (2013) performed a psychometric evaluation of the MIES that resulted in 
further categorical clarity of the transgressions factors for moral injury: Transgressions-Self (i.e., 
acting in ways that violate one’s moral values), Transgressions-Other (i.e., witnessing others 
acting in ways that violate one’s moral code), and Betrayal. They found that Transgressions-Self 
overlapped the most with PTSD symptomology and that Transgressions-Self and Transgressions-
Other were “moderately associated with pessimism and hopelessness” (p. 155). They did not find 
that the Betrayal scale was significantly associated with current measures of psychological 
distress.  
In an effort to cement construct validity, Vargas et al. (2013) reviewed narrative 
responses from the National Vietnam Veterans’ Readjustment study in order to corroborate 
causal events and symptoms of moral injury with older primary source material and found that 
there was significant overlap. One important difference they noted was that there was a 
heightened corroboration of “Loss of Trust” themes with the Vietnam veteran sample as 
compared to Drescher et al.’s (2011) findings with Iraq and Afghanistan veterans, suggesting 
that there may have been particular elements of the Vietnam war that generated a greater sense of 
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betrayal for its veterans. Several other studies explored the impact of moral injury on populations 
other than combat veterans: Gibbons et al. (2013), for example, performed a narrative analysis to 
look at how combat-deployed nurses and physicians incorporate morally injurious experiences 
and Dombo et al. (2013) applied Litz et al.’s  (2009) model of moral injury to three civilian cases 
in order to distinguish it from PTSD.  
Nash & Litz’s (2013) oft-referenced theoretical study of moral injury as a “mechanism 
for deployment-related psychological trauma in military spouses and children” (p. 366) offered 
the most extensive model of moral injury to date (by utilizing the supportive research of 
Drescher et al., 2011 and Nash et al., 2013) and further made the case for moral injury being 
distinct from PTSD. They argue that because moral development is ideally a gradual process—a 
five-year-old child is usually not confronted with the hard fact of death or the human capacity for 
extreme violence—and because moral development is not experienced in isolation but always 
relationally, it can additionally be viewed as the result of a challenge to a moral belief system 
that is not developmentally or situationally prepared to incorporate it. They state that “[t]he 
relative toxicity of potentially morally injurious events may correlate not only with how violently 
they appear to contradict existing moral schemas, but also the extent to which they compromise 
the ability of existing social and spiritual supports to maintain a secure holding environment” (p. 
370).   
With this model of moral injury in mind, they propose that military spouses and children 
are vulnerable to moral injury directly through the news or stories shared by family members, 
churches, and schools, and indirectly “through actions or failures to act, perceived to be 
committed by members of one’s moral covenant, including family members, teachers, 
community leaders, a deity, or oneself” (p. 370). A child, for example, may experience indirect 
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moral injury as a result of an adult’s emotional withdrawal, self-destructive behavior, or suicide. 
Additionally, they argue, “Community leaders, most especially those in the military, may be 
agents of indirect wartime moral injury through their perceived failures to honor their 
commitment to service members, veterans, and their families” (p. 371).  
Again, as with a good portion of the clinical scientific moral injury research to date, a 
driving force here is the need to separate moral injury from PTSD and to lend more weight to the 
notion that events may be traumatic and morally injurious even when they are not directly life- or 
safety-threatening.  
 
Expanding Research on Perpetration, Guilt, and Shame 
In the wake of Litz et al.’s (2009) working definition of moral injury, the effort to 
generate more empirically based research on the mechanism of perpetration in relation to moral 
injury became a priority in the field. Partly because a substantial body of research already existed 
on the psychologically deleterious effects of killing and abusive violence (Grossman, 2009, 
Beckham, Feldman, & Kirby, 1998; MacNair, 2002), several publications have already resulted 
from this effort. In the first study to look at the impact of killing on veterans of the recent 
conflicts, Maguen et al. (2012) found that the impact of killing on suicidal ideation was mediated 
by depression and PTSD symptoms, and that the impact of killing on the desire for self-harm 
was mediated by PTSD. In 2013, Maguen et al. designed a latent class analysis with Iraq and 
Afghanistan veterans to determine whether those who killed in war were at risk for being the 
most symptomatic for PTSD. While the findings were limited in that they were retrospective and 
cross-sectional, they nonetheless demonstrated that those who killed were twice as likely to have 
the most symptoms of PTSD. In addition, those who killed a civilian or killed in the context of 
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anger or revenge were more likely to belong to the most symptomatic PTSD group than those 
who did not kill.  
Craig Bryan and his colleagues performed two important studies that looked in different 
ways at the relationship between severe combat trauma and self-injurious thoughts and 
behaviors. In Bryan, Ray-Sannerud, Morrow, and Etienne (2012), they sought to determine if 
guilt was differentially associated with suicidal ideation in military personnel with a clear history 
of direct combat exposure, and indeed found a positive interaction between guilt and direct 
combat exposure with 97 active duty Air Force personnel, which in turn suggested to them a 
strong relationship between guilt and suicidal ideation. In the more ambitious study, Bryan, 
Bryan, Morrow, Etienne, and Ray-Sannerud (2013) used a general clinical sample of 151 
predominantly active duty (98%) Air Force and Army personnel to explore the relationship 
between moral injury and self-injurious thoughts and behaviors (SITB). The results backed up 
what previous research had suggested, namely that Transgressions-Other correlates more 
strongly with traditional symptoms of PTSD, while Transgressions-Self has a stronger 
relationship with hopelessness, guilt, and shame.  
The primacy of guilt and shame as key agents in moral injury has been highlighted in 
almost all the clinical research on this subject. In their review of the literature on the association 
between morality and the experience of guilt and shame in the military, Nazarov et al. (2015) 
include the recent research by Bryan et al. (2013) and also note that guilt and shame are the 
leading cause of veterans seeking care at the VA (as cited by Fontana & Rosenheck, 2004). They 
conclude that there are “strong relations between the incurrence of a moral injury, the subsequent 
development of symptoms of guilt and shame and the emergence of psychopathology, including 
MDD and PTSD” (p. 10).   
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The most significant work on the relationship between guilt, shame, and moral injury has 
emerged from the research of Farnsworth, Drescher, Nieuwsma, Walser, & Currier (2014). 
Farnsworth et al. (2014) examine moral injury through the complementary lenses of moral 
psychology and social functionalism, with the intent of providing further insight into the 
mechanisms of guilt and shame, as well as betrayal and abusive violence. They chart how in the 
last decade advances in the study of moral psychology have provided new understanding of how 
human beings both come to their moral judgments and make sense of those judgments. This 
body of research has differentiated between positive and negative emotional states and examined 
their adaptive purpose. Negative emotional states, they demonstrate, provide protective functions 
by engaging the sympathetic nervous system (i.e. fight/flight), while positive emotions engage 
the parasympathetic nervous system, and tend to enhance human functioning by building 
resources.  
As Farnsworth et al. (2014) explain, moral emotions specifically can hold both positive 
and negative valences. Negative moral emotions include guilt, shame, anger, disgust, and 
contempt; positive moral emotions include compassion, elevation, pride, and gratitude. Crucial 
to note is that moral emotions, unlike nonmoral emotions, are fundamentally concerned with the 
preservation of social relationships and with helping individuals avoid ostracism by other group 
members (as cited in Rime, 2009; Haidt, 2003).  
Farnsworth et al. (2014) cite a number of studies that demonstrate that when guilt is 
limited to a specific transgression (and separated from other negative emotions) it has no 
association with psychopathology (Tangney et al., 2007). Farnsworth et al. (2014), however, 
distinguish between civilian guilt and combat-related guilt, noting that the latter has been 
“associated with lower psychological well-being in military populations,” although “studies 
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assessing military-related guilt may also be tapping into the more psychologically damaging 
emotion of shame” (p. 452).  
 Indeed, shame has been associated in multiple studies with tremendous psychological 
distress and symptomology (Lewis, 1971; Lansky, 1995; Tangney et al. 2007). As noted 
previously, shame indicates a global evaluation of the self as being worthless or fundamentally 
bad. It is accompanied by feelings of powerlessness, exposure, and vulnerability. In a recent 
essay, Herman (2011) made the case for posttraumatic stress disorder being essentially a shame 
disorder and stated that,  
Shame can be likened to fear in many respects. Like fear, it is a fast-track 
physiological response that in intense forms can overwhelm higher cortical 
functions. Like fear, it is also a social signal, with characteristic facial and 
postural signs that can be recognized across cultures. (p. 262) 
Additionally, Farnsworth et al. (2014) maintain that  
whereas guilt can promote greater empathy and socially reparative actions, shame 
typically activates social hiding behaviors and decreases empathy due to increased 
preoccupation with one’s own distress and emotional discomfort. Furthermore, 
shame has been robustly associated with substance abuse, anger, and aggression, 
whereas guilt often discourages these types of problematic behaviors. (p. 452)  
Farnsworth et al.’s (2014) exploration of a social-functional model of morality within the 
context of the military provides additional nuance to the moral injury construct. Social 
functionalism is defined as “the pragmatic value of morality for the survival of a social group as 
a whole” (p. 453). Some of the key moral emotions that are evoked in response to core social 
issues are caring, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity (as cited in Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
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2009). Since the good of the group depends on the individual holding back in some regard, this 
holding back is encouraged by self-condemning emotions like anger, contempt or disgust. On the 
other hand, self-condemning emotions like shame and guilt encourage repair of damage to the 
group by an individual (Farnsworth et. al., 2014). 
 In a military context, of course, violence and killing are not only sanctioned but viewed 
as critical for the good for the group. As Farnsworth et al. (2014) note, citing Soeters, Winslow, 
& Weibull (2006), military training and indoctrination serves the purpose of shifting a new 
soldier’s moral compass so that it is fully in line with the needs of their unit and ensures that 
under combat situations a soldier will pull his or her trigger. As Farnsworth et al. (2014) state,  
In such a moral system, the greatest shame for a service member would be to 
forsake his or her unit in the face of danger, and the greatest moral anger is 
typically reserved for those who put group members at risk. However, it is also 
this tight moral system and its constituent moral emotions that may also enable 
members of a fighting unit to engage in potentially morally injurious behaviors in 
certain cases. Threats to or losses sustained within the fighting unit may prompt 
strong other-condemning moral emotions (i.e., anger, disgust, contempt) that 
increase the probability of abusive violence. (p. 12)  
Farnsworth et al. (2014) also delineate how witnessing moral violations can lead to moral 
injury, and give credence, from a social functionalist perspective, to Shay’s (1994, 2014) original 
claim that betrayal by others is what leads to moral injury. They note how, as part of entering a 
military universe and acclimating to a military-based moral code, leaders are endowed with 
positive moral attributes, with a kind of nobility, and if those leaders violate their position and 
thereby the attached values, the soldiers under them may be psychically impacted by feelings of 
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betrayal and condemnatory moral emotions. Ajax, it could be said, exhibits condemnatory moral 
emotions toward Odysseus. But such feelings may also be brought forth when a soldier 
experiences betrayal from an enemy who posed as a friend or, as in the example Farnsworth et 
al. (2014) give, from a child who delivers a bomb.   
Farnsworth et al. (2014) highlight another potentially morally injurious scenario and time 
period for soldiers: post-deployment. They point out that there is often a shattering disjuncture 
between what is morally valued in the military world versus the civilian world. Civilians may 
react with disgust or contempt upon hearing what soldiers have done in war; soldiers may 
experience shame and anger in relation to their homecoming. In other words, the soldier may 
find himself or herself stuck between two fundamentally different moral universes, which can 
lead to experiences that are morally injurious in and of themselves. As Farnsworth et al. (2014) 
state, “social-functionalist models of morality clarify not only the moral emotions experienced 
by service members following moral injury, but also help to explain how moral emotions may 
contribute to morally injurious behaviors themselves (p. 255).  
 
Moral Repair 
It is no accident that Litz et al.’s (2009) defining theoretical exploration of moral injury 
ends with a preliminary treatment model, and that, indeed, so much of the clinical literature that 
has followed has also tried to create models of repair or at least address treatment implications: 
the clinical research community may need measures and conceptualizations in order to move 
forward with the moral injury construct, but service members and veterans need help now.  
Litz et al. (2009) define moral repair as “the integration of [a] moral violation into an 
intact, although more flexible, functional belief system” (p. 701) and conceived their original 
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treatment model (which would become adaptive disclosure) on the basis of two basic “routes” to 
repair: “(a) psychological-and-emotional-processing of the memory of the moral transgression, 
its meaning and significance, and the implication for the service member, and (b) exposure to 
corrective life experience” (p. 701). Three years later, Grey et al. (2012) published an 
introduction to and an evaluation of the six-session adaptive disclosure protocol in a study with 
44 active duty Marines. Adaptive disclosure first uses imaginal exposure to uncover previously 
hidden elements and details about the meaning and implications of the morally injurious event 
and then employs an empty chair exercise, based on gestalt therapy techniques, to allow for 
corrective experiences. 
We ask the service member or veteran to have a real-time conversation in 
imagination with a compassionate, generous, supportive and forgiving moral 
authority figure. . . . [T]he goals are to have the patient ostensibly confess the 
transgressive act of commission or omission and take on the role of the caring 
other, reacting for him or her (Steenkamp et al., 2013, p. 474).  
Forty three percent of the Marines in the study acknowledged a morally injurious experience as 
the primary need for treatment and Gray et al. (2012) found that patients highly endorsed the 
treatment, and that the effect sizes for PTSD (d =.79) and depression (d =.71) were large.   
By way of further validating adaptive disclosure, Steencamp, Nash, Lebowitz & Litz 
(2013) argue that there are three ways in which prolonged exposure (PE, Foa & Kozak, 1986)—
as previously noted, a widely-used treatment for PTSD at the Department of Defense and the 
Department of Veterans Affairs—is not appropriate for moral injury. First, PE treatment assumes 
that “the pathological fear structure is caused by a discrete episodic experience of danger and 
perceived life threat” (p. 473), whereas certain experiences that have been demonstrated to cause 
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moral injury are not fear based. Second, PE treatment maintains that guilt and shame, the 
primary emotions underlying moral injury, have emotional pathways and mechanisms that are 
different from the pathways and mechanisms of fear, and that repeated retelling of an event, a 
primary fear-extinguishing technique used in PE, will not only not decrease shame and guilt but 
will potentially increase them. Third, the two main cognitions targeted in PE—“I am 
incompetent” and “the world is completely dangerous”—are profoundly different than the 
cognitions that Steenkamp et al. (2013) believe underlie moral injury, namely, “culpability, being 
damned and unforgiven, and self-loathing” (p. 472). Wholesale contextualizing of the event—
i.e., bad things happen in war, as is used in PE—may not feel authentic or reparative to the 
person who has committed an act that fundamentally violates their moral code.  
Two other studies place primary emphasis on the concept of self-forgiveness. 
Worthington and Langbert (2012), who come from a Christian framework, cite self-
condemnation as the aftereffect of a toxic warzone combination of complex trauma and moral 
injury. They conceive of self-forgiveness as the route to reparation and see it as having two core 
components: (1) decisional self-forgiveness, which is making the choice to act towards oneself 
without “malice, self-blame or self condemnation” (p. 282) and (2) emotional self-forgiveness, 
which they describe as the “emotional replacement of unforgiving emotions toward the self like 
self-empathy, self-sympathy, self-compassion and self-love” (p. 282). They propose a six-step 
model to “responsible” self-forgiveness that hinges on Hall and Fincham’s (2005) notion that 
“forgiveness of the self is related to making amends to the wronged person” (p. 282).   
Bryan, Theriault, and Bryan (2015) propose in their quantitative study that because guilt 
and shame are so strongly associated with suicidal ideation and attempts in a military 
populations, thinking about the healing and protective properties of self-forgiveness, may prove 
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critical. They define self-forgiveness as “the act of generosity and kindness toward the self 
following self-perceived inappropriate action” (p. 40) and note that evidence suggests it has been 
shown to improve mental health and decrease suicidal ideation (as cited by Doran, Kalayjian, 
Toussaint, & DeMucci, 2012). Using a sample of 476 service members and veterans enrolled in 
college, they hypothesized that self-forgiveness would be linked to less severe PTSD and that 
service members and veterans with a history of suicidal ideation or attempts would report lower 
levels of self-forgiveness. Both hypotheses were borne out, suggesting that self-forgiveness as a 
dispositional characteristic may serve as a protective factor for individuals who experience 
trauma, and thus may be useful for determining in advance those at particular risk. Bryan et al. 
(2015) note that difficulty with forgiveness “is a symptom of moral injury that commonly occurs 
in the aftermath of exposure to events that violate service members’ sense of right versus wrong 
(e.g., “use of violence, witnessing of atrocities, exposure to intense suffering)” (p. 41), and argue 
that their study suggests that another feature besides guilt and shame—i.e., difficulty with 
forgiveness—can be associated with increased risk for suicidal attempts among service members 
who have already considered suicide. Their results, they conclude, also point toward the 
possibility that  
treatments and interventions that facilitate self-forgiveness may reduce the 
likelihood of suicide attempts, perhaps because self-forgiveness enables the 
individual to view him-or-herself in a positive manner, to experience personal 
growth, and to find meaning in behavior that is perceived to be wrong. (p. 45)  
The first distinct call for models of moral repair treatment was, of course, put forward by 
Shay (1994). Given the emphasis in his ground-breaking definition of moral injury on the 
betrayal perpetrated by powerful others and his belief that the injuries of combat PTSD “are 
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moral and social” (p. 187), it is not surprising that his ideas around treatment also hinge on the 
moral and the social. While Shay does not offer a clear-cut treatment protocol, he urges for an 
overhaul of our response to combat trauma and for a better understanding in the mental health 
field that the repair of moral injury is dependent on a “communalization of trauma” (p. 194).  
Veterans need to be able to create narratives around their experience, to remember and to mourn. 
But simply creating their own trauma narrative is not enough: their narrative also needs to be 
heard by listeners, both individual and collective, who are “strong enough to hear the story 
without having to deny the reality of the experience or to blame the victim” (p. 188). This is not 
an easy mandate, given that “[t]o hear and believe is to feel unsafe. It is to know the fragility of 
goodness” (p. 193). But it is vital. As Shay notes,  
Trauma narrative imparts knowledge to the community that listens and responds 
to it emotionally. Emotion carries essential cognitive elements; it is not separable 
from the knowledge. Something quite profound takes place when the trauma 
survivor sees enlightenment take hold. The narrator now speaks as his or her free 
self, not as the captive of the perpetrator. (p. 191) 
 
Conclusion 
In the last third of Virginia Woolf’s novel Mrs. Dalloway (1925), Septimus Warren 
Smith, a World War I veteran suffering from what appears to be moral injury, kills himself. 
Upon hearing of his suicide, Clarissa Dalloway, who has never met him, responds in the 
following way:  
What business had the Bradshaws to talk of death at her party? A young man had 
killed himself. And they talked of it at her party—the Bradshaws, talked of death. 
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He had killed himself—but how? Always her body went through it first, when she 
was told, suddenly, of an accident; her dress flamed, her body burnt. He had 
thrown himself from a window. Up had flashed the ground; through him, 
blundering, bruising, went the rusty spikes. There he lay with a thud, thud, thud in 
his brain, and then a suffocation of blackness. So she saw it. But why had he done 
it? (p. 184) 
I would argue that Clarissa’s why remains with us today, and is precisely what is driving Litz et 
al.’s (2009) formulation of moral injury and the wave of clinical scientific research that has 
emerged to validate and expand this construct. But there is another element in the above passage 
that is pertinent: Clarissa’s resistance to knowing about Septimus’ death. And that, of course, 
remains as well. 
Indeed, alongside the work of Litz et al. (2009), there is a parallel track of insight and 
investigation into moral injury, galvanized by Shay and now led by contemporary philosophers, 
theologians, journalists, novelists and even theater directors, that is concerned with our society’s 
collective resistance to the implications of moral injury. Such lines of inquiry, some of which I 
will incorporate more fully in my discussion chapter, also resist embedding moral injury in a 
medical model, resist overly qualifying and quantifying this ancient state of being and, in some 
cases, resist, as Woolf implicitly does, the notion that this injury is located solely within the 
individual. As Warren Kinghorn (2012), a professor of psychiatry and pastoral and moral 
theology at Duke, writes,  
The recognition of moral injury therefore forces trauma psychology to regard the 
human person in all of his or her complexity as a moral agent, fully situated 
within and constituted by a sociocultural matrix of language and meaning and 
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valuation in which “trauma” cannot be understood apart from understanding of 
that matrix. Trauma of this sort is not an individual reality but a social reality, the 
social is not the context in which individual trauma is inflicted, but just as 
plausibly, the individual is the context in which social trauma is inflicted. (p. 62) 
Along similar lines, Nancy Sherman (2015), a professor of philosophy at Georgetown, 
identifies moral injury as a kind of multifaceted relational breakdown: between the soldier and 
himself, between the soldier and whomever he/she killed or witnessed killed, and between the 
soldier and civilian society. Recovery, she states, “is a matter of shared moral engagement. The 
afterwar belongs to us all” (p. 3). This, of course, is a clear extension of Shay’s (1994) call for 
“communalization” of war trauma as a crucial component in the healing of moral injury. 
I highly value Sherman’s notion that moral injury requires an understanding of the 
intrapersonal and the interpersonal, and that any kind of moral repair most likely hinges on 
reconciling what has transpired for the self in relation to itself as well as in relation to others. I 
also value Litz et al.’s (2009) urgent attempts to identify as precisely as possible what is 
happening to our service members and veterans. What Litz et al. (2009) and the less construct-
bound thinkers like Shay (1994), Kinghorn (2012) and Sherman (2012, 2015)—not to mention 
Brian Doerries (2015) and Virginia Woolf (1925)—share, is an unwavering belief that moral 










This is to propose that human beings are interpreting beings—that we are active 
in the interpretation of our experiences as we live our lives. It’s to propose that 
it’s not possible for us to interpret our experience without access to some frame of 
intelligibility, one that provides a context for our experience, one that makes the 
attribution of meaning possible. . . . It’s to propose that we live by the stories that 
we have about our lives, that these stories actually shape our lives, constitute our 
lives, and that they “embrace our lives.” 




 Narrative therapy, a collaborative approach to therapy, is well suited for social workers 
who work with any kind of trauma in their practice, let alone the trauma—the moral injury—that 
comes from experiences of war. It is a framework that at its heart seeks to separate the person 
from the problem, to separate the identity of the solider, for example, from the problem of killing 
in combat, the problem of grief, guilt, or shame.  
Narrative therapy was pioneered in the 1980s in Australia by Michael White, and 
continued to be rigorously developed and honed by White and his frequent collaborator, David 
Epston, up until White’s death in 2008 (Furlong, 2008). While many other thinkers and 
clinicians have contributed to our current understanding of narrative therapy and have made 
possible its widespread use in the field of mental health as an alternative to psychodynamic 
therapies, White’s creativity and brilliance is undeniably the foundation of this practice and 
therefore his guiding formulations are what I will focus on here (Payne, 2006).    
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White’s conceptualization of narrative therapy, which draws from multiple disciplines, 
including sociology, anthropology, cybernetics, and social psychology, and from thinkers like 
Gregory Bateson (1972, 1979), Edward Bruner (1986), Erving Goffman (1961, 1970), and 
Michel Foucault (1979, 1980, 1984a), is firmly founded on post-modernist terrain (White & 
Epston, 1990). A post-modernist vantage point holds that human existence cannot be fully 
pinned down and that no matter the lens through which it is studied—economics, psychology, 
sociology, etc.—it is too unique and complex and non-static an experience for any definite 
conclusions to be drawn. Within this framework, the notion of expert knowledge is viewed as 
biased and limited and “often remote from the specific concrete knowledge of people living their 
unique lives from day to day” (Payne, 2006, p. 25).  
Foucault’s (1984) deconstruction of systems of power and knowledge and his emphasis 
on subjugated “alternative knowledges” (White & Epston, p. 21) were galvanizing for White, 
who oriented his own thinking around them, particularly with regard to three fundamental 
assumptions he brought to narrative practices:  
1. It is the totalizing, dominant “truths” or narratives about human nature 
and human existence that have created the problems people suffer from in the first 
place (White, 2007, p. 24). As White & Epston (1990) note,  
a person’s experience is problematic to him because he is being 
situated in stories that others have about him and his relationships, 
and that these stories are dominant to the extent that they allow 
insufficient space for the performance of the person’s preferred 
stories. Or we could assume that the person is actively 
participating in the performance of stores that she finds unhelpful, 
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unsatisfying, and dead-ended and that these stories do not 
sufficiently encapsulate the person’s lived experience or are very 
significantly contradicted by important aspects of the person’s 
lived experience. (p. 14) 
2. The therapist, in order not to unwittingly collude with dominant 
narratives, must take a collaborative, de-centered position in relation to people 
who seek help. White likened the therapist’s posture to that of an “investigative 
reporter,” a figure who can help “expose” the “politics” of the problems in 
people’s lives (White, 2007, p. 26, p. 27).  
3. The key to unbinding people from their problems—from their 
“canonical narratives” around such things as professional success, parenting, or 
heterosexuality—(Payne, 2006, p. 21)—is to deconstruct dominant narratives and 
thereby uncover rich areas of “subjugated knowledges” (White & Epston, 1995, p. 
25) that are more in synch with actual lived experience.  
White considered narrative therapy to be a post-structuralist therapy, and indeed, an 
exquisite sensitivity to the practices of power within language, within the analogies and 
metaphors that are used to describe human experience, is evident throughout narrative practice 
(Payne, 2006). Language, in the view of White and other post-structuralists, constitutes much of 
our experience and therefore our sense of ourselves and of our agency in the world. The 
difference, for example, between using the Freudian psychoanalytic analogy of a “breakdown” to 
describe a person’s situation (which, as White points out, is drawn from the positivist social 
sciences and represents people and problems as machines) is vastly different than using the 
analogy of a rite of passage, drawn from ritual processes, which constructs the situation in terms 
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of a separation phase (from a previous identity or state), a liminal phase, and a reincorporation 
phase (White & Epston, 1990).  
For White it is the text analogy, which rests on the basic notion that we give meaning to 
our lives and experience, “through the storying of experience” (White & Epston, 1990, p. 12), 
that is a founding assumption of narrative practice in part because of its inherent potential for 
“flux” and its “relative indeterminancy” (p. 13). As White & Epston note,  
the text analogy introduces us to an intertextual world. In the first sense it 
proposes that persons’ lives are situated in texts within texts. In the second sense, 
every telling or retelling of a story through its performance, is a new telling that 
encapsulates, and expands upon the previous telling. (p. 13)  
While White (2007) does not propose that “life is simply a text,” he does believe there is much 
richness to be found in drawing “parallels…between the structure of literary texts and the 
structure of meaning-making in everyday life” (p. 80). Privileging the notion of a text analogy 
within narrative therapy opened the door for the exploration of the use of therapeutic documents. 
As White & Epston (1990) note, “language plays a very central part in those activities that define 
and construct persons.” Since “written language makes a more than significant contribution to 
this . . . a consideration of modern documents and their role in the redescription of persons is 
called for” (p. 188). Such documents, which can include letters of introduction, letters of 
redundancy, letters of prediction, letters of counter-referral, letters of reference, letters for special 
occasions, letters as narrative, and letters as self stories, as well as documents of certification and 
of declaration, have remained a vital component of this practice (White & Epston, 1990).  
White’s prodigious synthesis of ideas, theories, and practices into narrative therapy lasted 
right up until his death. In his final book, Maps of Narrative Practice (2007), published the year 
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before he died, White drew together four interrelated processes for therapeutic change: 
Externalizing, Re-Authoring, Re-Membering, and Definitional Ceremonies. In my view, this 
final organization of narrative processes, all of which White had previously written about in a 
variety of guises and contexts, successfully distills the multiple therapeutic approaches he used 
throughout his career; they all, in their own way, address White’s indefatigable quest to support 
people’s agency in shaping their own lives. In the remainder of this chapter, I will offer a more 
in-depth description of each, as they offer potentially impactful therapeutic resonance with the 
phenomenon of moral injury.  
 
Externalizing the Problem 
 According to Carr (1988) and Payne (2006), the most enduring and central therapeutic 
technique of narrative therapy is externalizing the problem. This entails first naming the 
problem—giving it its own identity, so to speak, one that is “experience-near” as opposed to 
“experience-distant” (White, 2007, p. 40)—and then coming to recognize it as something that is 
affecting a person rather than something that is an innate part of a person. It is fundamentally de-
pathologizing because it takes as its premise the notion that “[t]he person is not the problem: the 
problem is the problem” (Epston, 1989, p. 26) and that, relatedly, the problem is not determinant 
of a person’s identity or life. Movement away from the problem is always possible—as is not 
necessarily the case, White might argue, in therapies or psychologies that view people as being 
primarily influenced by intrapsychic forces—because the problem, on both a purely linguistic as 
well as metaphorical level, is defined as being outside the person. A person is not, in this 
framework, objectified as a schizophrenic, but is rather a person with the problem called 
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schizophrenia. (That said, White would undoubtedly rail against the term schizophrenia as he 
stood firmly against what he viewed as the dominant, pathologizing discourse of diagnosis.)  
By separating the problem from the person, narrative therapy does not seek to diminish 
the influence of the problem or to absolve the person from responsibility in the face of the 
problem. Indeed, as White (2007) notes, such separation makes it  
more possible for people to assume this responsibility. If the person is the 
problem there is very little that can be done outside of taking action that is self-
destructive. But if a person’s relationship with the problem becomes more clearly 
defined, as it does in externalizing conversations, a range of possibilities become 
available to revise this relationship. (p. 26)  
Externalizing conversations, as narrative practice maintains, offers people the opportunity not 
just to tease out the effects or influence of the problem in their life—i.e., What has X persuaded 
you to believe about yourself? or What are the effects of X on your relationship with your 
girlfriend, with your siblings, with your fellow veterans?—but to also investigate why the effects 
of a problem are—or are not—okay with a person. This line of inquiry re-instates personal 
agency and provides people with the opportunity to assess their values, goals, and dreams, 
thereby “develop[ing] important conceptions of living, including their intentional understanding 
about life . . . their knowledge about life and life skills, and their prized learnings and 
realizations” (White, 2007, p. 49).   
It is important to note that while externalizing the problem is a core component of 
narrative practice, White and others operating from within this framework do not consider it to 
be advisable in every situation (Carr, 1998, Payne, 2006). Indeed, White’s entire philosophy, his 
commitment to narrative theory and therapy, is to subvert any absolutes—in life or practice 
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(White, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2006). Instead, he counsels rigorous consciousness and respect for the 
uniqueness of each person, each problem, each situation. He states,  
This consciousness discourages the therapist from inviting the externalizing of 
problems such as violence and sexual abuse. When these problems are identified, 
the therapist would be inclined to encourage the externalizing of the attitudes and 
beliefs that appear to compel the violence, and those strategies that maintain 
persons in their subjugation. (White, 1989, p. 12; emphasis added) 
 
Re-Authoring  
Re-authoring in narrative therapy is first about locating and making space for the “unique 
outcomes” (White & Epston, 1990, p. 15) in people’s lives that run counter to dominant stories 
of suffering or oppression. Unique outcomes are the pockets of experience—again, the 
“subjugated knowledges” from a Foucauldian frame (White & Epston, 1990, p. 25)—that have 
previously been overshadowed by totalizing cultural narratives. Unique outcomes stand in direct 
contrast to problem-heavy narratives that bring people in to therapy in the first place. They are 
about those moments, large or small, when the so-called problem did not dominate, when 
resistance or subversion were employed and a flicker of an alternate plotline was made visible. 
Once recognized, unique outcomes serve as stepping stones to the rebuilding, the reauthoring of 
alternate narratives to live by, narratives that can be more in synch with a person’s true values 
and actual lived experience.  
Drawing directly from the work of the social psychologist Jerome Bruner (1986), White 
(2007) proposes that stories, be they the stories in novels or the stories of our lives, are composed 
of two main landscapes: “landscapes of action” (p. 78), which refers to the sequences of events 
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or plotlines, and “landscapes of identity” (p. 78) which are reflections on and “intentional 
understandings” of the action. Crucially, in both written and lived texts there are always “gaps” 
(p. 77) in the storylines. In good novels, these “gaps” allow the reader to bring in their own lived 
experience, make their own leaps and conclusions, and essentially enter the text.  
The “gaps” in the texts of lives are, of course, the “unique outcomes” and again, the job 
of a good narrative practitioner, through structured landscape of action and identity 
questioning—what White calls “mapping” (p. 83)—is to help make those moments more visible 
to the person. An example of a landscape of action question might be “What sort of step would 
this be if you took it?” (p. 96), while a landscape of identity question might be “What does this 
step suggest about what you hold precious? (p. 105). From a narrative viewpoint, both questions 
thicken personal narratives and in so doing help facilitate for people an experience “of being 
knowledged” (p. 106) about their own lives. The power of that knowledge allows for movement.  
As White (2007) puts it, 
The therapist facilitates the development of these alternative storylines by 
introducing questions that encourage people to recruit their lived experience, to 
stretch their minds, to exercise their imagination, and to employ their meaning-
making resources. People become curious about, and fascinated with, previously 
neglected aspects of their lives and relationships, and as these conversations 
proceed, these alternative storylines thicken, become more significantly rooted in 
history, and provide people with a foundation for new initiatives in addressing the 
problems, predicaments, and dilemmas of their lives. (pp. 61-62) 
As White’s words make clear, it is not the simple recalling of unique outcomes that makes a 
difference. It is instead the expanding of them through linkages to other historic moments that 
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calls forth the possibility of new understandings, that brings forth “indeterminacy,” and enables 
the rejection of “determined storylines” (Payne, 2006, p. 94).  
 
Re-membering 
Re-membering, within White’s (2007) narrative framework, is based on the idea that we 
are always surrounded by influential others, by people inside and outside of our families of 
origin who have played profound roles in shaping who we are. These influential others, in 
White’s view, do not have to be human; they can also be, for example, authors who have 
mattered to us, fictional characters we have encountered, pets we have owned, beloved toys from 
childhood. Human identity, within this framework, is “founded upon an ‘association of life’ 
rather than on a core self” (p. 129), and to that end narrative therapy highly values the voices of 
others in the building or re-authoring of lives. Re-membering conversations, White explains, are 
“purposive reengagements with the history of one’s relationship with significant figures and with 
the identities of one’s present life and projected future” (p. 129).  
White’s conceptualizations of re-membering conversations originated with his dismay 
over the “normative” and “pathologizing” (White & Epston, 1998, p. 134) response to people 
who were deemed to be suffering from unremitting grief. He found that the prescription to move 
through the stages of grief and get over the loss of a loved one not only increased a sense of loss 
of the loved one, but bored a hole right though a person’s sense of self and of their own agency. 
Instead, White focused on finding ways to incorporate the lost relationship, to use the metaphor 
of “saying hullo again” to help people “thicken” their experience of themselves as being part of a 
“membered club” and not an isolated, “encapsulated self” (p. 138). At the same time, the process 
of re-membering can “revoke” (p. 138) membership and de-emphasize those voices in a person’s 
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life that have contributed to a subjugated sense of self or purpose. In both cases, the movement is 
toward action and agency, rather than passivity and paralysis. In White’s view, the act of re-
membering enables people to have a more acute sense of what they know and value, and this in 
turn “can provide the basis for them to develop specific proposals about how they might proceed 
with their lives” (White, 2007, p. 138).   
 
Definitional Ceremonies  
White’s formulation of definitional ceremonies—which are structured occasions that 
allow a person to tell their “preferred stories” to an actual audience—draws heavily on the work 
of the cultural anthropologist Barbara Myerhoff (1982, 1986), and also, to a lesser extent, on the 
reflecting processes developed by the family systems therapist Tom Anderson (1987). Myerhoff, 
who coined the term “definitional ceremonies,” had observed the healing benefits that occurred 
for a group of elderly Jewish holocaust survivors who came together as a community to create 
different contexts or “forums” in which they could tell, again and again, the stories of their lives, 
and in so doing mitigate their isolation—and the inevitable, identity-crushing feeling of 
invisibility that comes along with such isolation (White, 2007, pp. 180-81). In Maps of Narrative 
Practice (2007), White includes Myerhoff’s (1982) elegant analysis of why such forums had 
such a beneficial effect for this particular marginalized and traumatized community. Given its 
applicability to communities of combat veterans, her words are worth reproducing here:   
Sometimes conditions conspire to make a generational cohort acutely self-
conscious and then they become active participants in their own history and 
provide their own sharp, insistent definitions of themselves and explanations for 
their destiny, past and future. They are then knowing actors in a historical drama 
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they script, rather than subjects of someone else’s study. They “make” 
themselves, sometimes even “make themselves up,” an activity which is not 
inevitable or automatic but reserved for special people in special circumstances. 
(p. 100) 
Key to the healing and identity-consolidating benefits of such occasions, in both 
Myerhoff and White’s view, is the presence of an active audience—what White (2007) came to 
call “outsider witnesses” (p. 184). The audience’s presence and participation, their active 
listening, and most of all, their own experience of being changed by the stories is vitally 
important for these occasions. As White notes, “It was the audience recognition of these stories 
that so significantly contributed to the community members’ achieving a sense of feeling at one 
with their claims about their lives” (p. 183).  
In translating Myerhoff’s ideas about the meaning of such occasions into narrative 
practice’s version of definitional ceremonies, White created a very specific structure: 
1. The telling of the significant narrative by the person.  
2. The re-telling of the narrative by those invited to be present as outsider 
witnesses. 
3. The retelling of the outsider witnesses’s retelling by the person. (p. 185)   
 White issues a clear warning of the ethical responsibility of therapists on such occasions. 
They are responsible both for the careful selection of the outsider witnesses and for preventing 
these moments from devolving into anti-transformative affirmations of the person telling their 
story. While White is clear that affirmation and validation of experiences can have a helpful 
place in daily life, they are not what definitional ceremonies are about. Definitional ceremonies 
are also not, in his words, about  
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offering congratulatory responses, pointing out positives, focusing on strengths 
and resources, making moral judgments or evaluating people’s lives against 
cultural norms . . . interpreting the lives of others and formulating hypotheses, 
delivering interventions with the intention of resolving people’s problems, giving 
advice or presenting moral stories or homilies, reframing the events of people’s 
lives, imposing alternative stories about peoples’ lives, trying to help people with 
their predicaments and dilemmas, or expressing worry for the lives of others. 
(White, 2007, p. 187) 
Instead, they are, at bottom, about one simple thing: resonance. The resonance between the 
outsider witness and the person at the center of the definitional ceremony creates “rich story 
development” (p. 189) and vitally aids the person at the center of the ceremony in trusting in 
their preferred narrative. In order to offer the most effective retellings, White guides his outsider 
witnesses in their active listening to focus especially on “expressions” within the story, 
“images” within the story, their own “personal resonances,” and finally, on the experience of 
their own “transport”  (White, 2007, pp. 190-91). 
In formulating these guidelines for response, White (2007) had in mind the ancient Greek 
understanding of katharsis, which he pointedly spells it with a ‘k’ in order to “distinguish it 
from contemporary notions of catharsis associated with metaphors of discharge, release, 
abreaction, and so on” (p. 194). The classic definition, he notes, hinges on the experience of 
witnessing a powerful display of “life’s dramas” (p. 195) and in response being emotionally 
moved and transported to a place of possible new meanings and new understandings of one’s 
own life. What the outsider witnesses need to specifically consider and then relay back, he 
argues, are the ways in which they “have become someone other than [they] would have been if 
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[they] had not been present to witness these expressions” (p. 195). White’s contention is that for 
the person at the center of this ceremony to hear of his or her own agency in this regard is 
revelatory, and often a counter-action to feelings of worthlessness, despair, paralysis and 
isolation. White particularly notes the benefit of this kind of ceremony for people who have 
experienced significant trauma in their lives. He states,  
It is common for these people to hold onto a secret longing for the world to be 
different due to what they have been through or a secret hope that all that they 
endured wasn’t for nothing, a hidden desire to contribute to the lives of others 
who have had similar experiences or a fantasy about playing a part in relieving the 
suffering of others, or a passion to play a part in acts of redress in relation to the 
injustices of the world. . . . [P]erformances of katharsis can be powerfully 
resonant with these longings, hopes, desires, fantasies, and passions. (p. 200)  
White’s narrative framework clearly views definitional ceremonies as yet another 
invaluable tool with which to dismantle totalizing discourses and the exertion of expert 
knowledge. The person at the center of the ceremony is positioned as both central and part of a 
responsive collective. Agency is experienced by both parties, and hitherto unforeseen narrative 
“plots” for each, as Meyerhoff (1986, p. 284) points out, are advanced. Lives in this narrative 
model are indeed more indeterminate, and problems—even the problems of severe trauma—are 
not cemented in place.  
 
Conclusion 
Undoubtedly, had White lived, his explorations of the varied and nuanced ways in which 
people can take charge of their lives would have continued. Narrative practice for him, as anyone 
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who enters one of his texts can plainly see, was not reducible to a therapy or an approach. It was, 
as he said, “better defined as a world view . . . but even this is not enough. Perhaps, it’s an 
epistemology, a philosophy, a personal commitment, a politics, a practice, a life” (White, 1994, 
p. 82). 
At this juncture, I’d like to raise several critical questions, questions that will be 
developed more fully in my discussion chapter. For example, what might Michael White’s 
conceptualization of narrative theory and therapy—and the various iterations of the practice that 
have continued since his death—offer to social workers who work with veterans in the grip of 
moral injury? To what degree is this a useful framework through which to view the trauma of, to 
quote Litz et al. (2009), “perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about 
acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” (p. 368)? Indeed, would a 
narrative perspective even accept the term “moral injury,” or at least the current operationalizing 
of a complex set of emotional responses?   
Aspects of narrative therapy, of course, are to be found already in many approaches to 
combat trauma, in, for example, the narrative portions of Cognitive Processing Therapy, one of 
the Department of Veterans Affairs go-to PTSD treatments (Department of Veterans Affairs, 
2015), as well as in Litz et al.’s adaptive disclosure protocol for moral injury, which, as noted 
earlier, asks the veteran to imagine “a compassionate, generous, supportive, and forgiving moral 
authority” (Steenkamp et al., 2013, p. 474)—a clear form of re-membering.  
But a serious consideration of aspects of narrative theory and practice in relation to the 
phenomenon of moral injury strikes me as important. If one simply holds in the forefront of 
one’s mind White & Epston’s (1990) notion of a receiving context, then from the start “a 
different construction of the problem would be invited and different questions will be asked” (p. 
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7). If, for example, one were to shift analogies away from broken parts, broken insides, broken 
morality, and view a combat soldier’s return to civilian life as a “rite of passage” that involved 
“separating” from a previous identity and status, moving through an uncomfortable, reorganizing 
“liminal phase,” and finally reaching a “reincorporation phase,” then that person’s position to 
himself and others might feel radically different (White & Epston, 1990, pp. 7-8). Arguably, the 
same would be true if one applied the narrative tools of externalizing—separating an identity 
from the isolating, paralyzing shame and guilt of moral injury and redefining the problem in an 
“experience-near” way (White, 2007, p. 42)—or re-authoring, so that alternate narratives could 
be constructed that would de-fang totalizing attitudes around strength, violence and heroism. 
Both re-membering (those dead, those killed, and those who are knowledged about subjugated 
aspects of an individual) and the creation of definitional ceremonies (Theater of War is an 
example of the latter) are, it seems to me, highly relevant to the phenomenon of moral injury and 
the experiences of combat veterans in general.  
That said, I have long been compelled by psychoanalytic approaches to human 
development, identity formation, and trauma. Given the magnitude of what I believe is 
experienced internally by those who are morally injured, a psychoanalytically oriented 
perspective on how human beings experience and respond to trauma must be considered 
alongside narrative practice. Can there be areas of overlap, of mutual expansion, of “rich story 
development” (White, 2007, p. 144) in the project of lessening the life-threatening impact of 
moral injury? With that question in mind, I will turn now to consider the work of the relational 








Relational Psychoanalysis and Adult Onset Trauma Theory 
 
We pulled Murph free from the tangle of brush and laid him out in some shadow 
of respectability. We stood and looked him over. He was broken and bruised and 
cut and still pale except for his face and hands, and now his eyes had been 
gouged out, the two hollow sockets looking like red angry passages to his mind. 
His throat had been cut nearly through, his head hung limply and lolled from side 
to side, attached only by the barely intact vertebrae. We dragged him like a shot 
deer out of a wood line, trying but failing to keep his naked body from banging 
against the hard ground and bouncing in a way that would be forever burned into 
our memories. His ears were cut off. His nose was cut off, too. He had been 
imprecisely castrated. 




In the previous chapter, I presented Michael White’s formulations of narrative theory and 
practice, which rest on the belief that as human beings we create stories in order to give meaning 
to our lives, and that this storying of experience provides a context and determining shape for the 
actual way we live. Personal agency, in White’s (2007) view, hinges on our ability to privilege 
certain forms of knowledge and experience over others—to construct rich narratives that break 
from dominant, pathologizing storylines and are instead in synch with lived experience.   
The development of rich narratives of experience is also of central concern for the 
relational psychoanalyst Ghislaine Boulanger (2007), whose pioneering work on the 
phenomenon of adult-onset trauma will be the focus of this chapter. Boulanger’s theory, which 
explores from within a relational framework what happens to a “self in crisis” (p. 77), a self that 
has experienced events that the mind cannot digest, hinges on the sharp distinction she makes 
between the phenomenology of trauma incurred as an adult and the phenomenology of trauma 
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incurred as a child—a difference that she ardently believes the psychoanalytic community has 
failed to appreciate. Her understanding of adult onset trauma has valuable implications for the 
treatment of individuals experiencing moral injury, as it delineates the sequelae of the shattering 
of an adult self and challenges long-held psychoanalytic notions about “the durability of psychic 
structure” (p. 12), as well as the classical psychoanalytic tendency to view adult reactions to 
external events as driven exclusively by the individual’s developmental history and particular 
object relations.  
At the same time, Boulanger is operating from within a relational framework; she is 
committed to the importance of conscious and unconscious processes, to the interplay of fantasy 
and reality, to the representation of mental states in bodily phenomena, and to the belief that the 
psyche constructs defenses and obstacles in the face of unsettling thoughts and feelings. Her 
theory thus offers a way to view moral injury through not only a cognitive behavioral lens (such 
as the one that most of the Department of Veteran Affairs PTSD treatment protocols are based 
on), nor only through an externalizing, deconstructing lens (such as the one that narrative 
practice offers), but also through the breadth and complexity of a psychodynamic lens.  
To that end I will first offer a brief overview of the relational tradition from which 
Boulanger’s theory springs. 
 
Relational Psychoanalysis 
The “relational turn” (Wachtel, 2008, p. viii) in psychoanalysis was driven by a varied 
group of thinkers and psychoanalysts (Mitchell & Greenburg, 1983; Aron, 2011; Bromberg, 
1993; Benjamin, 1988; Davies & Frawley, 1994) who felt a theoretical urgency to crack open the 
tightly sealed intrapsychic view of human subjectivity that Freud first developed and emphasize 
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instead the fundamental intersubjectivity of human experience. The developing consensus was 
that, as Mitchell (1988) put it, “[e]mbeddedness is endemic to human experience” (p. 276). 
Drawing on traditions of thought such as object relations, Sullivanian interpersonal 
theory, self psychology, gender studies, infancy and attachment research, relational theory 
“recontextualizes” classical notions of internal structures and unconscious processes by 
conceiving of those structures and processes in relation to an other, in relation to a context 
(Wachtel, 2008, p. 40.) Relational theory, which is really an umbrella term rather than one set 
theory, thus attends simultaneously to 1) the centrality of the self; 2) the self’s need for 
relatedness to objects/others, and 3) the dynamic, on-going tension between self and other, past 
and present, intrapsychic and interpersonal (Aron, 2011, p. 113). For relational theorists, all 
exchanges within the therapeutic setting are co-constructed by patient and therapist, just as the 
relationship between mother and child is intersubjective and co-created. Relational thought is 
grounded as well in a belief in the determining significance of race, class, and culture as forces 
that are “an intrinsic part of the psychological depths . . . fundamentally determinative of both 
conscious and unconscious thought and experience” (Wachtel, 2011, p. 69).  
Some key constructs in relational theory include the relational unconscious, self states, 
and dissociation. The relational unconscious—unlike the Freudian model of the unconscious, 
where distressing thoughts and feelings are considered repressed—is thought of as a stage for 
what Bollas (1989) calls the “unthought known,” (p. 4), a location for templates of relationships 
that are not fully known to the individual yet still feel familiar and are determinative of behavior. 
Self states are a reformulation of the Freudian idea of a compact unitary self and, according to 
Bromberg (1993), speak to the self as being “nonunitary in origin— a mental structure that 
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begins and continues as a multiplicity of self-states that maturationally attain a feeling of 
coherence” (p. 162).   
The concept of dissociation is central within relational thought. As Boulanger (2007) 
notes, the idea of dissociation re-merged when several psychoanalytic thinkers, notably Davies & 
Frawley (1994), began to grapple with the emotional effects of childhood sexual abuse, viewing 
the accounts and behavior of their clients as representative of reality rather than fantasy, as had 
more or less been the dominant psychoanalytic view since Freud abandoned his seduction theory 
(Boulanger, 2007, p. 26). Dissociation within the context of childhood abuse was understood to 
be the process whereby painful experiences and thoughts are split off and stored in multiple self-
states, rather than repressed in an encompassing unconscious. A relational perspective maintains 
that when a child encounters abuse “she defensively dissociates in the face of her terror, her 
confusion, and the unmanageable stimulation she is experiencing, forming split-off self states 
encapsulating the entire set of traumatic self and object representations, leaving other self states 
free to engage a less threatening world” (p. 13).  
It is important to note that in relational thought dissociation is not just a phenomenon 
driven by abuse, but is something that happens to all of us, and is a reflection of the multiplicity 
of our self-states, the different selves we consciously or unconsciously shift into depending on 
the context. What is considered a “healthy” use of dissociative processes is when we can, as 
Bromberg (1996) puts it, “stand in the spaces” between these self states and not defensively 
cordon off certain ones that may contain aspects of a traumatized self, thus hindering emotional 
flexibility and behavior.  
The process of dissociation can also occur on a macro level, and indeed, Boulanger sees 
just such a process at work when it comes to the failure of society in general and the 
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psychoanalytic community in particular to respond to the catastrophic events that plague our 
world. Again, this has implications for the phenomenon of moral injury, given that those who are 
currently affirming its existence within the healthcare system (Litz et al., 2009) have discovered 
that the wide gap between the universe of the military and the universe of the civilian world can 
in and of itself be morally injurious for those attempting to navigate that divide. For Boulanger, 
such a gap represents that which a collective group does not want to see, and she frames her 
conception of such a divide, informed by a Lacanian perspective, within the context of adult 
onset trauma:  
It is as if psychoanalytic theory itself has denied or dissociated the possibility of 
lasting reactions to late onset trauma, just as childhood seduction was also denied 
for much of the last century. This stepchild to psychoanalysis is properly located 
in Lacan’s register of the Real. Events that constantly fail to secure a place in 
social discourse—slipping out of conscious awareness and defying memory’s 
attempts to register them, leaving instead a gap where understanding might be, or 
a sense of confusion where clarity might be—belong to the Real. The Real is at 
work in every act of destructive violence that is rapidly normalized, every 
instance of genocide that is overlooked, every war whose combatants find no 
socially acceptable avenue in which to describe their experiences and so are 
condemned to silence. (p. 4) 
  
Wounded by Reality 
Ghislaine Boulanger (2007) traces the beginning of her interest in the phenomenon of 
adult onset trauma to an epidemiological study of Vietnam veterans and their civilian 
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counterparts that she was a part of in 1976. Her goal was to parse “what had caused the 
psychological breakdown of so many veterans on their return home” (p. 8). She hypothesized 
that she would find predisposing factors that led to the development of PTSD; instead, she 
discovered, quoting Grinker and Spiegel (1945), that “every man had his breaking point” (p. 44, 
as cited in Boulanger, 2007). Since then, she has published a book—Wounded by Reality: 
Understanding and Treating Adult Onset Trauma (2007)—and numerous articles (2008, 2009, 
2010, 2012a, 2012b) on her evolving conception of adult onset-trauma. 
A handful of other theorists have offered meaningful conceptualizations of aspects of 
adult onset trauma, and Boulanger readily acknowledges psychoanalysts like Kardiner (1969), 
Krystal (1978, 1985), Des Pres (1976), and Laub & Auerhan (1989), many of whom were 
writing in response to the horrors of World War II and the Shoah. But Boulanger is, to my 
knowledge, the only writer who has truly synthesized the existing material and offered a 
systematic formulation of the symptomology and phenomenology of this kind of trauma, not to 
mention the only one that I have found to claim that “adult onset trauma can actually be more 
damaging than trauma in childhood” (p. 39).  
So what does this kind of damage, this psychic “breaking point” look like from 
Boulanger’s perspective? An utter buckling of the self: “massive psychic trauma collapse[s] the 
distinction between the world without and the world within” (p. 10). As a result, “nightmares and 
violent fantasies suddenly find their equivalent in external events, leading to the collapse of 
psychic space and foreclosing the mind’s ability to reflect” (p. 10).  
To be clear, with the term “adult onset trauma,” Boulanger is referring to those situations 
where adults face either their own imminent annihilation or the annihilation of those around 
them; she has little patience for what she sees as the wild overuse of the term “traumatic” within 
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our society as potentially applying to almost any situation. But in extreme instances of adult 
trauma she theorizes that an individual’s humanity, their sense of themselves as having an intact 
subjectivity, is abruptly fragmented—that they are reduced to a “thing . . . denied history, and 
denied a meaningful context in which to live and to relate to others” (2008, p. 641). Boulanger 
sees the individual then existing in a gap “entre deux morts”—a Lacanian term that refers to two 
deaths, a “natural” or “biological” death, which is part of nature’s usual process, and an 
“absolute death.” As she explains, “Their biological death has not happened, but they . . . feel 
themselves to be outsiders; intimate knowledge of mortality has robbed them of their citizenship 
within the ranks of the living” (2007, p. 38). In a recent New York Times article, a marine combat 
veteran of the war in Afghanistan gave voice to this precise sensation when he said, “Now, when 
I meet someone, I already know what they look like dead. I can’t help but think that way. And I 
ask myself, ‘Do I want to live with this feeling for the rest of my life, or is it better to just finish 
it off?’” (Philipps, 2015). 
Psychoanlysis, in Boulanger’s view, has historically not been able to fully mentalize the 
very specific processes of adult onset trauma because the focus—indeed the very notion of the 
trauma—has been solely on the individual’s response rather than on the event itself. They have 
also, in her view, “confused reason with reality, arguing that the irrational exists within the 
psyche, not in the external world” (p. 57). But, as she and a few others (notably Des Pres,1976) 
point out, truly horrific events turn that which for most of us might be metaphorical or fantasized 
into actuality. Before other meaning can be made, that terrifying non-symbolic reality must be 
understood and assimilated. Boulanger states that in the aftermath of such events,  
[s]ymbols and the symbolic lose their currency. . . . When indifferent reality 
cannot be assimilated or altered psychically, when it cannot be symbolized, it 
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becomes traumatic reality. It is a reality that sticks in the psychic craw and cannot 
be dislodged. The survivor is always choking on the fact of it, always fearing a 
repetition of the breakdown that has already happened (Boulanger, 2007, p. 56-
58, citing Winnicott, 1974).  
 
Catastrophic Dissociation in Adulthood 
 Relational theory’s rediscovery of dissociation (Boulanger, 2008, p. 642) allowed 
clinicians to understand the mechanism whereby a child, to defend against unbearable stimuli 
and thoughts and feelings—and therefore a state of utter fragmentation—cordoned off traumatic 
events and memories into split off self states, leaving other self states to function and develop. 
As Boulanger notes, “In childhood, trauma becomes part of self-experience” (2007, p. 29).  
 For adults, who already have a developed self, as well as an observing capacity to 
understand death, the process is significantly different—and it is precisely catastrophic 
dissociation, in Boulanger’s (2008) view, that causes the collapse of the self: 
In adulthood, the dissociative process in the face of trauma does not create further 
splits in a developed personality but defends against terror, leaving an indelible 
memory of the dissociative experience itself. Provisionally catastrophic 
dissociation offers protection from terror, but ultimately it leaves the survivor in a 
state of confusion and anomie. (p. 643)  
Pulling together research and theory from affective neuroscience, emotions theory, Winnicottian 
object relations and relational theory, Boulanger deconstructs the actual process of a self 
collapsing through catastrophic dissociation by charting the way it impacts four key interrelated 
areas: an individual’s sense of agency, physical cohesion, continuity, and affectivity. Crucial to 
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understand here is that her conceptualization of a “core self” is somewhat at odds with relational 
theory’s idea of multiple self states, which she also subscribes to. As she explains it, her 
understanding of a core self is in synch with Damasio’s (1994, 1999) “ever-changing 
biologically based core self” and with Bucci’s (2001) “subsymbolic sources of the self”: 
phenomena that exist at the edge of our consciousness and “are comprised of the tactile, motoric, 
visual, sensory, and affective senses and are central to one’s body and emotional experience” 
(Boulanger, 2008, p. 643). Boulanger argues that by including these neurologically and 
biologically-based components into a conceptualization of human subjectivity,  
it is possible to conceive of an underlying core self that establishes broad 
physiological and psychological parameters, while shifting self states embedded 
within the core are informed by the relative durability of the core self or—in the 
case of adult onset trauma—by the traumatically undermined core self. (p. 644) 
 
Agency, Physical Cohesion, Continuity, Affectivity 
 One’s sense of agency is, as Boulanger maintains, inextricably linked to one’s sense of a 
reassuring and reliable existence where one can control one’s actions and movement. She notes 
that Stern (1985) and Fonagy et al. (2002) see this aspect of core self experience first emerging 
with the infant and young child’s ability to control motor behavior. But such control over 
movement is often obliterated during traumatic experience, in which people freeze or soil 
themselves or lose control of their body’s movement, as can happen in instances of sexual attack. 
Being under the control of an Other entity, whether it is another human being or a New York 
City tower collapsing—or even the unwilled process of dissociation itself—brings a person, in 
Boulanger’s mind, back to a paranoid schizoid position where “the self exists only as an object” 
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(2007, p. 81). From such a position, the self is at the ongoing mercy of “persecutory 
convictions,” be they thoughts, feelings, or sensations prompted by a memory, a sound, a smell, 
even the quality of the light. “Traumatic memories often resist the survivor’s need to make sense 
of them. Instead, assaulted by memory fragments and unidentifiable sensations, survivors find 
themselves further alienated from a formerly stable core self” (p. 82).  
 Catastrophic dissociation’s impact on physical cohesion is equally destabilizing. Our 
skin, our bones, all of the components of our body are, in such moments, revealed to be 
horrendously fragile. Boulanger (2007) writes that “When the sense of physical cohesion is 
threatened during trauma, there is a fragmentation of bodily experience, leading to 
depersonalization, out-of-body experiences, and derealization” (p. 85). Drawing on Winnicottian 
ideas around handling the baby and thus aiding in the formation of the baby’s sense of physical 
and psychic integrity, Boulanger describes the body as functioning as a kind of “a psychic 
container” (p. 87) that allows for both a secure sense of self as well as a sense of the separateness 
of others, which is ultimately necessary for mutually satisfying human connection. But under 
conditions of extreme trauma, when we lose our sense of physical cohesion,  
[t]he body can no longer contain agency, affect, or objects; the distinction 
between inner and outer collapses. Space and time cease to be dimensional; there 
is no escape from the immediacy of the trauma, and the fundamental bonds to a 
benign other are lost. (p. 88) 
 In considering the role that continuity, or a sense of time, has for individuals, Boulanger 
draws again on Winnicott’s understanding of optimal development for a true self whereby the 
baby is allowed a sense of ‘going on being’ by an attuned mother who creates an environment of 
gentle intrusions, gentle rhythms around feeding, handling, and holding. During catastrophic 
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dissociation, the invasion of our sense of going on being is violent. The experience is rendered 
frozen and indigestible by both physiological (i.e neurologically, chemically based fight/flight 
responses) and psychological processes, and in the aftermath, our ‘going on being’ is perpetually 
hijacked by the traumatic memory’s reintroduction through nightmares, behavioral reenactments, 
intrusive thoughts, and full-on flashbacks. The individual lives in a state of continual reaction, a 
“meaningless now,” (p. 90) and thus continuous experience of oneself as a self through time is no 
longer possible. This violation of time, Boulanger believes, also impacts an individual’s ability to 
interact with others, to maintain a healthy sense of “self-other” differentiation, as again, our first 
sense of time and continuity exists in an intersubjective field between mother and baby. Time is 
a vital component of that containing original matrix, and when it is trespassed upon in adulthood, 
“the consequences reverberate throughout the entire psychic system” (p. 91).  
 Disrupted affectivity in the face of massive trauma is, as Boulanger (2007) points out, a 
result of the complex interplay between psychic terror and neurophysiological arousal—e.g., the 
activation of the sympathetic nervous system and the flooding of cortisol that prepares an 
organism for fight or flight. Krystal (1978, 1985) and others have also noted the effect of 
alexithymia in the aftermath of near annihilation, which is the “failure to differentiate affects and 
to use them as signals” (Boulanger, 2007, p. 7) One’s ability to know one’s responses—and 
thereby to be in relation to a core self—is disturbed. Barraged by an activated nervous system 
and unspeakable terror, numbness becomes the provisionally adaptive affect of choice, both in 
the moment of trauma—which is how the body mobilizes to survive mortal threats—and 
thereafter. But, of course, numbness is deadening. In reflecting on the experience with a combat 
veteran Boulanger worked with she writes that “[t]he ‘I’ who experienced a range of feelings is 
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gone, and with it the sense of ownership of experience. No longer punctuated by affect, his life 
has become rote. He has, in effect, forfeited his subjectivity” (p. 92).  
Boulanger also observes how many who have experienced such trauma continue later on 
to seek out highly dangerous situations, as though to reenact the circumstances that led to their 
collapsed self state. While classical psychoanalysis has often argued that this kind of repetition is 
aimed at mastering the fear so that one can return to a balanced psychic state, she sees it 
differently for adult onset trauma, as this repetition does not bring relief but reflects more of a 
desperate attempt to puncture the state of numbness.  
Disrupted affect, whether it is a sea of numbness or unwilled states of unbearable anxiety 
from intrusive stimuli (e.g. burning toast causing the nervous system to react as though the house 
is on fire) has grave consequences when it comes to human relations:  
With the failure to register one’s own feelings comes both the inability to share 
one’s affective state with an other, and the failure to appreciate the other’s 
affectivity, which is the basis of intersubjective experience lying at the heart of 
the capacity to feel related to others. (p. 94) 
 
Traumatic Aloneness and Key Reconsiderations of Relational Practice with Adult Onset 
Trauma 
In Boulanger’s (2007) theoretical framework, the decimation of the intersubjective field 
has profound, rippling effects on the individual. She notes that it was Ferenczi (1933) who first 
observed that “traumatic aloneness” is what truly causes the psyche to implode (p. 193, as cited 
in Boulanger, 2007, p. 96), and sees this kind of aloneness as stemming from three interrelated 
areas: 1) the loss of internal structuring object relations; 2) the loss of external relations; and 3) 
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the “imagined loss of membership in the human community” (p. 96). She observes that often in 
cataclysmic trauma the “world of objects,” as Ferenczi called it (as cited in Frankle, 1998, p. 47), 
vanishes and the individual’s desperate (and biologically ordained) efforts to survive render other 
human beings obsolete. Holding this knowledge forces them up against what the Auschwitz 
survivor Primo Levi (1958), who ultimately committed suicide, came to believe: “[I]n the end 
everyone is desperately and ferociously alone” (as cited in Laub and Auerhan, 1989, p. 49). 
When, as often happens with combat soldiers, a close friend is killed, this abrupt loss, this 
destruction of a protective Other, can also have an implosive effect on all of the individual’s 
object relations, and easily lead to repetitive, obsessive guilt. From this vantage point, “survivor 
guilt” can be seen as a way to maintain connection to “both personal continuity and ties to lost 
objects” (Boulanger, 2007, p. 99).  
And although natural-made traumas can destroy faith in a predictable, ordered universe, 
the internal object world seems to be particularly disrupted, Boulanger stresses, when the source 
of the adult trauma is another human being, be that a rapist, a sniper or, perhaps most 
disorienting of all, a child wrapped in a bomb. Boulanger points out that “how we were seen” 
(presumably by an original loving caretaker) is “less relevant than how we are seen” (p. 100)—
i.e., as an object deemed not worth living. Often, in the absence of a benign internal world, the 
individual will choose to identify with the abuser in order to escape the desolation of an 
objectless world, becoming violent and aggressive themselves.   
Upon “return” from massive trauma, the capacity of others to understand what has 
happened is sorely tested, which of course exponentially increases a sense of isolation. As 
Boulanger puts it, “With objectlessness comes meaninglessness; there is no internal other to 
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guide expectations, no external other to understand the experience. The loss of the 
intersubjective means that inner experience cannot be shared” (p. 102).  
Relational theory’s emphasis on the co-construction in therapy of intersubjective space is 
thus seriously challenged: how can there be an intersubjective, reparative space when, in the face 
of massive trauma, one has lost one’s subjectivity? How can there be healing? In response to this 
question, which is at the core of her book, Boulanger states that,  
Insisting prematurely on an examination of a patient’s intersubjective experience, 
when the patient’s internal object world has been so severely compromised by 
recent reality, denies the patient an opportunity to explore the experience of the 
collapsed self that should be foremost in the treatment. In the psychodynamic 
treatment of adult onset trauma, the clinician’s task is to hold herself out as the 
other to whom the patient can, at first tentatively, relate, and to tolerate how 
irrelevant the patient may believe the entire process to be. The task is to tolerate a 
feeling of unrelatedness without analyzing it. (p. 102) 
The task, as Boulanger goes on to outline, is to first become a witness to the reality of 
what has happened. This is not a co-constructing position, nor is it one that hinges on 
intersubjective recognition. Indeed, Boulanger (2008) believes that forced “recognition” for what 
is, in fact, unrecognizable to those who have not experienced adult onset trauma, is demeaning 
and further damaging. Indeed, it is the therapist’s “involved otherness” (p. 652), that is precisely 
what is called for. The therapist needs to function as both witness and container. In containing 
the unspeakable horrors and refraining from analyzing them or drawing connections to earlier 
experiences, the therapist begins to demonstrate that these fragmented sensations and states of 
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being can be tolerated and slowly made sense of in their actuality. She describes how this 
process unfolded in her harrowing work with one woman:  
As she described her imprisonment and rape, the tension between joining and 
observing—the tightrope that clinicians walk in every session—dissolved, I 
became one with Celeste. My own boundaries were temporarily suspended as I 
absorbed horror, disgust, humiliation, pain, and grief that were to haunt me for 
several weeks. In my subsequent conversations with Celeste, I learned that 
knowing that I was a separate person who had voluntarily stepped into her 
experience, that I was prepared to bear witness to this experience, and bear up 
under the experience began the process of reanimating her object world, and 
reduced her sense of having been rendered untouchable. (p. 652)  
As noted earlier, the inability to reflect or symbolize because “meanings are too 
threatening to entertain” (Boulanger, 2007, p. 115) is precisely what holds people in a locked-
down, posttraumatic state. For Boulanger this, in combination with neuropsychological findings 
of how memories are processed, accounts for the repetitive nature of posttraumatic nightmares, 
the reliving upon reliving of the terror; the mind’s inability to actually convert the material into a 
dream. “The unconscious has ground to a halt before the work of the Real and the creative 
dreamwork of condensation and displacement is unavailable” (p. 120).  
But again, by experiencing the therapist as an “other” who can “contain” and “detoxify” 
that which has been too terrible to mentally entertain by the individual, the slow process of 
trusting that another mind can “reflect on the experience without being deadened” begins, and 
the individual gains back some of their own reflective processes—and thereby their connection 




In her work with survivors of adult onset trauma, Boulanger has noted time and time 
again what she calls the “lifeless” trauma narrative. These narratives of traumatic experience are 
lifeless because they are spoken from a dissociated state, a state that has lost the ability to 
symbolize. They are “safe,” “repetitive,” “unelaborated” (p. 132), and spoken as if into a 
vacuum. The other, the listener, is not called forth in the telling because, as Boulanger has 
theorized, the other has, on a fundamental level, ceased to exist for the individual.  
A living narrative, on the other hand, “is always dialogical” (p. 133) because it speaks to 
an actual or imagined responsive other, someone “who is a subject in her own right, who listens 
and is free to have her own thoughts and reactions to what she is hearing” (p. 134). A living 
narrative, in other words, is predicated on the belief and felt experience of “an internal empathic 
other” (Laug & Auerhahn, 1988, as cited in Boulanger, 2007, p. 134).  
As previously noted, before a person can be helped to create a living narrative, the 
therapist must demonstrate his or her ability to contain and survive the fragments of memory and 
horror that have been experienced. But once that has been accomplished, Boulanger believes the 
construction of a living narrative is critical, as it is a living narrative—with its implication of 
responsive others—that will offer felt proof to the narrator that he “did not die and was not 
disintegrated by the experience itself but by the fear of annihilation” (Kardiner, 1969, p. 254, as 
cited in Boulanger, 2007, p. 137). 
For Boulanger, these living narratives can be spoken or written, but the key is that their 
construction is slowly deepened, elaborated upon, and mutually considered. The benefit 
Boulanger sees to actually dictating or writing the narratives, and then slowly revising and 
developing them, is that they can offer a way of “getting the memories outside” (p. 139). One 
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patient who laboriously dictated to Boulanger at least four versions of her experience of escaping 
from Ground Zero with her baby, articulated her eventual feeling of release in the following way: 
“I don't have to remember all the details because they are written down” (p. 145). In the act of 
transcribing this woman’s words, Boulanger saw herself as demonstrating again her capacity to  
contain her memories without distorting or minimizing them. Understanding that I 
was not damaged—that I could record what she was saying, process it and hand it 
back to her in this case quite literally verbatim—allowed Jill to feel sufficiently 
held that she could reflect further on what she had said. (p. 149) 
It is at this point in therapy, when a living narrative is being constructed, that the vitality of an 
intersubjective space comes again into play for survivors of adult onset trauma. The narrative, 
although fundamentally that of the teller, is nonetheless co-constructed in that it is jointly 
reflected upon, the process of creating it is jointly reflected upon, and the story is shifted back 
and forth from teller to listener to teller again. In Boulanger’s experience the narrative, the text of 
the trauma, then becomes a “transitional object, neither hers nor mine, both inside and outside at 
the same time, constantly open to reflection and change” (p. 149). While Boulanger does not 
hold out tidy endings to trauma that is so shattering to both body and soul, she does see a 
pathway out of the most deadening aspects of it; a person cannot ever be the same as they were 
before the trauma, but they can, in her mind, rejoin the living, human community.  
 
Conclusion 
Although Boulanger’s (2007) theory of adult onset trauma comes from a vastly differently 
intellectual base—one that believes in the basic efficacy of psychodynamic thoughts and 
practice—her belief in the constitutive power of narrative echoes White’s belief:  
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Narrative is transfigured memory that, in its turn if it is a living narrative, further 
transfigures memory. . . . In privileging narrative we privilege the successive 
unfolding of increasingly complex experience. To privilege narrative is to 
understand that to relate a traumatic memory (or any memory) is to construct the 
memory, to formulate experience that has previously remained unformulated. (p. 
149) 
For Boulanger, the creation of a trauma narrative that with each telling gains more life, more rich 
development and reanimated associations, is “an act of subordination” (p. 150) with respect to 
the gaps in experience where new insight might be located.  By formulating a deeper “personal 
understanding” (p. 150) out of traumatic fragments—in White’s language this might be called a 
preferred narrative—an individual can slowly reclaim the lost parts of him or herself. But this is 
not a quick fix, in Boulanger’s view; this is not “short term therapy” (p. 150). Boulanger is 
careful to emphasize that a living narrative is always an “open text” and that this “openness,” this 
continual reconstitution, is key if the effects of massive trauma are to be lessened (p. 150). 
Massive trauma, in her view, is an ever moving, often elusive target. It is always highly 
individual. It cannot be solved with easy equations. As she notes,  
When details of the trauma itself and of its consequences, have been categorized 
and fixed in place, the response to terror is reduced to a formula. Rather than 
encouraging understanding of the experience, it is forced into recognizable and 
socially prescribed categories that discourage further investigation. In the very act 
of being labeled, the subject located by this diagnosis has ceased to be a subject, 
becoming instead an object of curiosity or a statistic. (p. 173) 
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What then to make of the evolving construct of moral injury? What happens to our 
understanding of this phenomenon as it is currently being defined and operationalized by clinical 
social scientists, when it is viewed through the lens of White’s (2007) narrative theory and 
Boulanger’s (2007) theory of adult onset trauma? Is moral injury a useful construct, a 
desperately needed recognition of a reality that is experienced by combat veterans, one that has 
come to a terrifying tipping point as evidenced by the number of veterans taking their own lives? 
Or is it just one more label, one more way in which we, as a society and as participants in the 
professional fields of mental health, avert our eyes? Or is there, perhaps, a third view: a tense 
middle ground, a dialogic relationship between the ways in which the construct is useful and the 
ways in which it is potentially dangerous? If that is the case, then we must also consider how 
both narrative therapy and adult onset trauma theory might offer measures of relief to those 
veterans who have entered a landscape of horror and trauma: those who have trespassed upon 









AIAI! Who would have thought the name 
I was given would sound out my misery?  
Aias! Ajax! Agony! 
  —Sophocles, Ajax 
 
 
I learned that words make a difference. It’s easier to cope with a kicked 
bucket than a corpse; if it isn’t human, it doesn’t matter much if it’s dead. 
And so a VC nurse, fried by napalm, was a crispy critter. A Vietnamese 
baby, which lay nearby, was a roasted peanut. “Just a crunchie munchie,” 
Rat Kiley said as he stepped over the body.    
 






 Words do make a difference—the word Ajax, after all, is etymologically “the sound of a 
blood-curdling scream, a cry of anguish and despair” (Doerries, 2015, p. 106)—and whether it is 
to shield oneself from trauma or to make meaning of trauma or to simply put sound to trauma, 
the transportive function of words is something that revolutionary thinkers from Sophocles to 
Shakespeare to Freud have all demonstrated. Narrative theorist Michael White (2007) and adult 
onset trauma theorist Ghislaine Boulanger (2007) also profoundly believe in the therapeutic 
efficacy of words and the life-changing narratives those words can create. To that end, applying 
the theories and insights of White’s narrative practice and Boulanger’s adult onset trauma theory 
to the current clinical construct of moral injury will be the basis of this chapter. 
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Moral injury in combat veterans, whether one favors Shay’s (1994, 2014) definition, 
which highlights the betrayal of others or Litz et al.’s (2009) definition, which considers more 
specifically the self-betrayal and self-transgressions related to perpetration, is a phenomenon that 
shatters one’s sense of trust in one’s world and oneself. My use of trust here is multifaceted and 
includes trust in oneself—i.e., one’s mind, one’s perceptions, one’s beliefs, one’s agency—as 
well as trust in others: a single individual, like a therapist, or a roomful of listeners in an 
auditorium. Finding ways to restore that trust is, in my opinion, the key to moral repair, and it 
seems to me that both narrative practice and adult onset trauma theory offer different and yet 
complementary pathways to such healing.  
Speaking generally, I would argue that narrative theory is particularly (although by no 
means exclusively) suited to addressing the socio-cultural aspects of moral injury: the betrayals 
and injuries incurred by dominant, pathologizing discourses, which can be disseminated not only 
by military commanders and civilians, but by mental health workers as well. As Shay (2014) 
notes,  
At its worst our educational system produces counselors, psychiatrists, 
psychologists, and therapists who resemble museum-goers whose whole 
experience consists of mentally saying, “That’s cubist! . . . That’s El Greco!” and 
who never see anything they’ve looked at. “Just listen,” say the veterans when 
telling mental health professionals what they need to know to work with them, 
and I believe that is their wish for the general public as well. (p. 5) 
Narrative practice, of course, also urges listening: listening for preferred storylines, for 
subjugated knowledges, for unique outcomes. This foundational emphasis on listening—and by 
extension moving away from realms of expert knowledge— along with a guiding belief in the 
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defining power of analogy and of de-pathologizing receiving contexts, positions narrative 
therapy as an important first step in the societal re-integration of combat veterans.   
 On the other hand, adult onset trauma as Boulanger (2007) defines it, is particularly 
suited to comprehending the psychodynamic components of moral injury: the specific, visceral 
experience and ensuing symptomology of having a self shattered by catastrophic violence that 
one has either witnessed or perpetrated—or, as is usually the case for combat veterans, witnessed 
and perpetrated. The symptomology and behavior changes related to moral injury that Nash & 
Litz (2013) and others (Farnsworth et al., 2014, Drescher, K.D. et al., 2011) have been 
painstakingly cataloguing in recent years bears repeating at this juncture for its sobering 
magnitude:  
Reported social and behavioral problems possibly associated with moral injury 
ranged from social withdrawal and alienation to aggression, misconduct, and 
sociopathy. Possible spiritual and existential symptoms included loss of religious 
faith, loss of trust in morality, loss of meaning, and fatalism. Possible 
psychological symptoms included depression, anxiety, and anger, while the 
characteristic self-depreciating emotions and cognitions thought to be associated 
with moral injury included shame, guilt, self-loathing, and feeling damaged. 
(Nash & Litz, 2013, p. 369)  
Given the magnitude of war-related psychological trauma—the fact that twenty-two veterans on 
average commit suicide every day, which amounts to almost one self-inflicted death per hour 
(Veterans Affairs, 2012, as cited in Doerries, 2015, p. 4)—attending to both the socio-cultural 
and the psychodynamic dimensions of that trauma is crucial for social workers engaged in 
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mental health treatment with combat veterans. Neglecting either of these components potentially 
creates further injury.  
Freud, in his essay, “Some Character-Types met with in Psycho-Analytic Work” (1916), 
turned to the texts of Shakespeare and Ibsen in order to illustrate his clinical points because of 
“the wealth of their knowledge of the mind” (p. 317). I too am compelled by the news about 
human beings that artists—be they writers or painters or actors or directors—have to offer the 
mental health field. In what follows, I will first briefly note several contemporary literary texts as 
a means of highlighting narrative theory’s applicability to moral injury, and then turn to Bryan 
Doerries’ public health organization, Theater of War, as an example of the way in which 
narrative practice may be brought to bear on moral injury. In the final section of the chapter, I 
will try to provide a more nuanced account of moral injury by reading Sophocles’ Ajax through 
the lens of adult onset trauma theory.  
 
Defining moral injury: a narrative tension  
At the outset, it is worth registering that narrative theory and practice, particularly as 
conceived of by White (2007), sit uneasily with the constructing and codifying of moral injury 
that is currently taking place in the social science circles connected to the Department of 
Veterans Affairs and the Department of Defense. Such clear-cut defining is, from the point of 
view of narrative practice, an example of positivism, a technique of power whereby one group 
(in this case the psychologists who are primarily defining the terms) holds knowledge of this 
“injury,” which by extension gives it power over those who “have” this “injury.” Even if one 
does not fully subscribe to narrative practice, this caution around defining a state of being that is 
ancient and utterly individual is warranted. If one were to use a narrative analogy to further this 
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point, one might say that while there are a limited number of plots in the world with regard to 
moral injury—plots that involve loss of trust and shame and despair—there are an infinite 
number of points of view as to what it like to actually experience moral injury. Narrative practice 
is a therapeutic approach that seeks to privilege the particular experience, the lived experience, 
and to resist soul-stultifying general narratives.   
That said, I should note too that at the moment, at least, the social scientists who are 
constructing the term are careful to specify, as Farnsworth et al. (2014) note, that they are “not 
advocating for a new disorder or descriptive diagnosis. Instead, Litz et al.’s (2009) definition 
affirms the existence of traumatic events that extend beyond the realm of fear and imminent 
threat to one’s physical safety” (p. 250). To dismiss the research and construct-building of moral 
injury from the social science realm as pathologizing discourse would be too easy: I firmly 
believe that Brett Litz (2009, 2013) and his colleagues see the psychological trauma of returning 
veterans as a full-blown crisis, and are mindful of constructing this phenomenon as an injury 
rather than an disorder. Their point of view is grounded in cognitive behavorialism; White’s 
(2007) and other narrative practitioners’ points of view are grounded in a post-modern, post-
constructivist model. Both frameworks are useful, and indeed, the complexity of moral injury 
seems to require a multi-directional approach. A balanced view can place the questioning of 
expert opinion and dominant narratives in a dialogic relationship with the evolving research and 
measures for moral injury and repair of moral injury.  
 
“Thank you for your service” 
Upending dominant discourses and re-authoring narratives that can flourish outside of 
those totalizing storylines is, as I’ve noted, a key technique of narrative practice. And if, as I’ve 
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also suggested, narrative theory and practice are particularly well-suited to addressing the socio-
cultural components of moral injury, it is then worth highlighting again several of the socio-
cultural phenomena that might in fact be morally injurious for veterans. Farnsworth et al. (2014) 
note that the re-entry period from deployment is a particularly “risky” (p. 255) time for soldiers 
and veterans, as they are moving from a military world with one set of moral guidelines to a 
civilian world with another set. “Whereas morality during deployment may be defined in large 
part with respect to the survival of the unit,” Farnsworth et al. (2014) write, “civilian morality is 
comprised of a larger number of comparatively trivial moral issues, virtually none of which 
condones lethal violence or aggression” (p. 255).  
Shay (1994) highlights the morally injurious actions of military commanders and the 
government for the combat soldier: “Lies and euphemisms by the soldier’s own military 
superiors and civilian leaders of course undermine social trust by destroying confidence in 
language” (p. 34). Shay places particular emphasis on the destructive powers of the “enemy” 
with regard to social trust: “The enemy does severe damage to a part of mental function that is 
critical to the maintenance of social trust: the trustworthiness of perception” (p. 43).  
The humanities scholar Robert Meagher (2014), while disputing neither the difference 
between military and civilian moral codes nor the profound injury of enemy action, sees the issue 
as much larger and insidious, rooted as it is, in the thousand-year-old tradition of “just war.”  
This is, undoubtedly the ground that the social scientists at the Department of Veterans Affairs 
and the Department of Defense, tread uneasily upon; it is the component of moral injury that 
they cannot sufficiently address, as Meagher’s thesis disrupts the whole basis for our recent—as 
well as our historical—conflicts. As he notes,   
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[t]he deceptive and destructive core of the Christian just war doctrine can 
be stated very simply. It is the claim that wars, or at least some wars, and 
all the killing and destruction they entail, are—in addition to being 
necessary—good and right, even virtuous and meritorious, pleasing in the 
sight of God. (p. xiv) 
Killing, according to this doctrine—according to what narrative practice would identify as a 
dominant narrative—is “radically distinct” from murder; it is “pure” (p. xiv). And yet, as 
Meagher points out, “[t]he truth is that just war theory has never made sense to those with blood 
on their hands nor to those whose blood it was. . . . So long as we cling to the moral justification 
of our wars we remain blind to the moral injury they inflict” (p. xvi).  
The “subjugated knowledge” (White & Epson, 1990, p. 25) of veterans “with blood on 
their hands” is too often obscured by totalizing storylines about spreading democracy, about 
America’s identity as the world’s peacekeeper, and about notions of heroism and missions 
accomplished. This is why the dissonance, as the cognitive behavorialists might say, that occurs 
for returning veterans who are congratulated for their heroism or thanked for their service is so 
painful and disorienting; it reflects a storyline or a “truth” that others are imposing on them and 
that is fundamentally not in synch with their actual lived experience. Many of the men I sat with 
in a Vietnam veteran’s group during my internship at the VA expressed their loathing of being 
called heroes. They felt they had done their job, followed orders. The notion of heroism, in the 
face of so much brutality, was unpleasant, even shaming, because it implied, in the person doing 
the congratulating, a blindness to the horrors of war, and was therefore a negation of the 
veteran’s actual experience.  
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Language, as White (2007) never tires of reminding us, is constitutive: and again, one has 
only to think of words like pride or courage with regard to going off to a “just war” to see the 
dominant narratives that are embedded in those words—and that, from a narrative perspective, 
determine the choices made by soldiers in and out of combat. The contemporary novelist Ben 
Fountain underscores this very point in Billy Lynn’s Long Halftime Walk (2012), a scathing look 
at the ways in which the civilian world mouths support for troops but ultimately turns away from 
their suffering. The following is passage is from a scene in which Billy, the Marine at the center 
of the novel, is being celebrated by the billionaire owner of a football team; all he hears, 
however, is moral dissonance:  
Pride, he says, but like a tape played too slow the word warps and fattens 
in Billy’s ear, ppprrrrRRIIiiiddde. Then courage, cooooOUURRraaage. 
Service, sssserrrRRRrvvviccce. SsssacccrRRRIiiifffice. 
HooooONNnnorrrr. DeeeterrRRRminaaaAAAtion. (p. 111) 
At an earlier moment, Billy reflects on how much death his Bravo Company has seen and 
comprehends another aspect of language-related moral dissonance:  
[G]iven the masculine standard America has set for itself it is interesting 
how few actually qualify. Why we fight, yo, who is this we? Here in the 
chicken-hawk nation of blowhards and bluffers, Bravo always has the ace 
of bloods up its sleeve. (p. 66)  
There is a relentlessly advertised “we” that is part of the dominant narrative about going to war, 
but that “we” swiftly disappears in the particularities of war. The veteran, like the central figure 
in Powers’ novel, is not a we but simply a he, left alone to “account for what he’s done.” 
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From a narrative perspective, simply exposing what White would call the “techniques of 
power” that are apparent in dominant storylines and the language of just war, is an act of 
therapeutic “insurrection” (White & Epson, 1990, p. 32), and would in itself serve to externalize 
some of the “problem” of moral injury. And once there is some externalized space between the 
problem and the person, there is room for movement and re-authorship. As White & Epson note,  
Once these techniques have been identified, unique outcomes can be 
located through an investigation of those occasions when the person could 
have subjected himself or others to these techniques but refused to do so. . 
. . Other examples of defiance can be identified and linked together to 
provide a historical account of resistance. . . . In identifying these unique 
outcomes, subjugation to the techniques of “normalizing judgment”—the 
evaluation and classification of person and relationships according to 
dominant “truths”—can be effectively challenged. “Docile bodies” 
become “enlivened spirits.” (p. 31) 
While White (2007) believed these narrative techniques could be highly effective in one-on-one 
settings, he came to recognize what he saw as an even greater therapeutic value for a person if an 
audience was also “engaged” in this performance of destabilizing dominant “truths” and 
unearthing preferred meanings (p. 178). 
As noted in my earlier chapter, his idea of definitional ceremonies developed out of his 
observation that the development of rich personal narratives so often “contradicted . . . socially 
constructed norms” (p. 179); he saw how critical it was for these new, norm-challenging 
narratives to be witnessed and “verified” by a group of others. As he points out, referencing 
Myerhoff (1982, p. 284),  
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[t]he prominence given to “collective self-definitions,” to the imperative of 
“appearing before others,” to “garnering witnesses to one’s worth, vitality, and 
being,” and to “proclaiming an interpretation to an audience not otherwise 
available” emphasizes the central significance of the contribution of the audience 
in these definitional ceremonies. It was the audience response to the stories told 
and performed in these forums that was verifying of these stories. It was the 
audience’s acknowledgment of the identity claims expressed in these stories that 
was authenticating of these identity claims. It was the audience recognition of 
these stories that so significantly contributed to the community members’ 
achieving a sense of feeling at one with their claims about their lives. In the 
context of these forums, the audience found themselves “participating in someone 
else’s drama” and becoming “witnesses who push a plot forward almost 
unwittingly.” (p. 183) 
It is the reverberating space between individual and community, the emotional exchange 
between part and whole that White came to believe had such transcendent—cathartic—potential 
for healing. Shay (1994), as I noted in Chapter II, also believes that it is precisely this kind of 
“communalization of trauma” (p. 4), this collective performance of listening to tragedy, that is 
necessary for the repair of moral injury. Healing, as Shay argues the ancient Greeks knew well, 
depends on “being able safely to tell the story to someone who is listening and who can be 
trusted to retell it truthfully to others in the community” (p. 4). His book Achilles in Vietnam 
(1994), ends with a cri de coeur for the mental health community to find new ways, beyond 
insular veteran support groups, to truly communalize the trauma of war: “Combat veterans and 
American citizenry should meet together face to face in daylight, and listen, and watch, and 
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weep, just as citizen soldiers of ancient Athens did in the theater at the foot of the Acropolis” (p. 
194).  
In 2008, at the invitation of Captain William Nash—who one year later would publish 
with Bret Litz and other colleagues their landmark article on moral injury and moral repair—
Bryan Doerries (2015) was able to do just that. Nash invited Doerries to a Marine base in San 
Diego and Doerries staged his first Theater of War reading in front of four hundred Marines 
(Doerries, 2015). Doerries demonstrated, unwittingly perhaps, just how relevant and effective an 
adaptation of White’s definitional ceremonies could be as a model of therapeutic repair for moral 
injury.  
 
Theater of War  
In presenting readings from Sophocles’ Ajax and Philoctetes to combined military and 
civilian audiences, Theater of War’s (2015) mission is straightforward:  
to de-stigmatize psychological injury, increase awareness of post-deployment 
psychological health issues, disseminate information regarding available 
resources, and foster greater family, community, and troop resilience. Using 
Sophocles’ plays to forge a common vocabulary for openly discussing the impact 
of war on individuals, families, and communities, these events [are] aimed at 
generating compassion and understanding between diverse audiences.   
Doerries, who first immersed himself in Old Testament languages as an undergraduate, is 
a writer, actor, director and translator (all of the Sophocles texts used by Theater of War are his 
translations), as well as a “self-proclaimed evangelist for classical literature and its relevance to 
our lives today” (Doerries, 2015, p, 8). He is adamant about the emotional, spiritual, and 
 
 86 
therapeutic value of Greek tragedies, subscribing to the view, as is stated in the Theater of War 
literature, “that ancient Greek drama was a form of storytelling, communal therapy, and ritual 
reintegration for combat veterans by combat veterans” (Outside the Wire, 2015). Sophocles, as 
Doerries (2015) points out, was himself a retired general and was writing during a war-striated 
period in which the Greeks had been in bloody battle for twenty years with the Spartans (p. 57). 
Crucial to remember is that Sophocles’ audiences (and his performers) would have been made up 
of soldiers and veterans. He was a veteran writing for veterans. And what were these veterans 
watching? In the case of Ajax, the mental plummeting, the berserk, bloody outburst, the crippling 
shame, and the ultimate suicide of a man who had been considered one of the greatest warriors in 
the Greek army. As Doerries notes in his book, The Theater of War (2015), just published this 
fall, 
At the center of the tragedy is the suicide of a combat veteran, one of the most 
graphic and iconic depictions of suicide in all of Western literature. Sophocles 
staged the violence of Ajax’s death mere feet from where the generals sat in the 
audience in the ancient Theater of Dionysus. But he did something else equally 
remarkable: he cleared the skene or “stage,” of all other characters and took the 
audience inside the mind of a person who is actively contemplating suicide, deep 
inside the insidious logic that leads him to end his own life. (p. 96) 
Theater of War is not theater of the kind that American audiences are used to: it is, Doerries 
writes, “the tool that we’re using to catalyze the discussion.” What Doerries has learned is that 
“when people see their own private struggles reflected in an ancient story, they open up and 
share some of the most personal and profound things—things they’ve never said out loud—let 
alone in front of an audience” (Doerries, 2013). 
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As a public health project, Theater of War has a very specific aesthetic for its readings, 
starting with the fact that all artifice is stripped away. There are no props, no costumes, and no 
set. The actors wear their street clothes. They sit behind a table with scripts and bottles of water 
in front of them. There are usually only two or three actors on stage, accompanied by Doerries, 
who reads minor parts. The auditorium lights are fully turned up on the actors—and on the 
audience. Doerries has a carefully considered rationale for this set-up: “by stripping the 
performance to its bare essentials, by focusing the actors’ considerable talents upon the power of 
the spoken word . . . I hoped to deliver the plays in their purest and most efficacious form” (p. 
74).  
Once the audience members have settled in their seats, Doerries offers a few opening 
remarks to set the scene before sitting down at the table with the actors. There is a pause—and 
then, always, BAM: in full character, full agony, the scene is on. Doerries says that he 
intentionally starts his scenes at full tilt, with an actor, depending on whether he/she is reading 
Philoctotes, Ajax, or Tesmessa, howling, shouting, or weeping. The audience is, invariably, 
riveted by this instant transformation, this shocking (as the street clothes, the water bottles, and 
the full lighting work to disarm expectations) descent into raw, emotional turmoil:    
   AJAX:  I call upon the Furies, 
   those long-striding  
   dread maidens who  
avenge humans and  
see to their endless 
suffering: witness 
how the generals  
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have destroyed me! 
 
Train your eyes on  
those evil men, 
snatch them with  
your talons and, 
   just as I die at  
my own hands,  
may they also be 
murdered by their  
own flesh and blood.  
It’s feeding time! (Doerries, 2015, pp. 80-81) 
Theater of War has reached thousands of service members and has held readings around 
the world, from Brooklyn to Scandinavia to Kuwait (Doerries, 2015, p. 7); media outlets from 
The New York Times to the Atlantic to the PBS Newshour have featured Theater of War; and at 
this point, Doerries has a stable of well-known theater and film actors at his disposal, including 
David Straitharn, Paul Giamatti, Blythe Danner, Giancarlo Esposito, Frances McDormand, 
Elizabeth Marvel, Jake Gyllenhaal, John Turturro, Amy Ryan and Martin Sheen (Outside the 
Wire, 2015). But just as Theater of War is not about theater in the usual way, it is also not about 
these famous actors: as soon as the reading, which usually lasts about an hour, is over, the actors 
quickly exit the stage. Their seats are taken by a panel of pre-selected community members, 
usually a combination of veterans and local mental health workers who have been asked prior to 
the reading to watch and be prepared to respond, from the gut, to what they have heard. Just like 
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White’s (2007) outsider witnesses, they are instructed not to come with prepared notes, not to 
take notes, but to just listen (Doerries, 2015).  
After the panel members have responded to what they have seen—Doerries considers 
them to be in the role of “the ancient Greek chorus, intermediaries between the plays and the 
audience” (p. 83)—Doerries then turns to the audience which, through advertising, recruiting, 
and word of mouth, has been filled with a diverse combination of active duty troops, veterans, 
and civilians. Doerries has several questions planned out for the discussion portion of the 
production, but almost always begins with this one: Why do you think Sophocles wrote this play? 
(Doerries, 2015, p. 4).  
From this point on, the audience is in charge. The actors often move around the 
auditorium, delivering the microphone to each new speaker. In some venues, standing 
microphones are set up in the aisles. The first time Doerries staged his reading, for the 400 
Marines in San Diego, they allotted 45 minutes for this discussion period. The conversation 
lasted three hours and had to finally be cut off after midnight (Doerries, 2015, p. 87). 
 Acting as part MC, part therapeutic conduit, Doerries asks more questions, builds off of 
the audiences words and language. In response to Doerries’s question about why Sophocles 
wrote Ajax, one enlisted soldier, as Doerries recounts in his book, declared, “in order to boost 
morale.” Doerries then asked him, “What is morale-boosting about watching a decorated warrior 
descend into madness and take his own life?” The soldier replied, “It’s the truth, and we’re all 
here watching it together” (Doerries, 2015, p. 4.) 
As Doerries notes,  
The soldier had highlighted something hidden within Ajax: a message for 
our time. Sophocles didn’t whitewash the horrors of war. This wasn’t 
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government-sponsored propaganda. Nor was his play an act of protest. It 
was the unvarnished truth. And by presenting the truth of war to combat 
veterans, he thought to give voice to their secret struggles and to convey to 
them that they were not alone. (p. 4) 
In other words, we are back to Shay’s (1994) “communalization of trauma” to heal moral injury 
and to White’s (2007) notion that definitional ceremonies “have the potential to be highly 
resonant” (p. 189). It is precisely this resonance that “contributes significantly to rich story 
development, to a stronger familiarity with what one accords value to in life, and to the erosion 
and displacement of various negative conclusions about one’s life and identity” (White, 2007, p. 
189).  
 
Theater of War Theory 
Over and over again, Doerries (2015) has found that Sophocles’ plays speak to the core 
experience of soldiers, veterans, and their loved ones. At one event, as he recounts, the wife of a 
Navy Seal stood up and declared, “My husband went away four times to war, and each time he 
returned, like Ajax, dragging invisible bodies into our house. The war came home with him. And 
to quote from the play, ‘Our home is a slaughterhouse’” (p. 83).   
In his efforts to reach as many soldiers and veterans as possible, Doerries has had to 
counter “two pervasive knee-jerk concerns” (p. 104), from mental health professionals who work 
with veterans: first, that the plays would be retraumatizing for veterans and exacerbate symptoms 
of depression and suicidality; and second, that the plays would “fly straight over the heads of 
those in the lower enlisted ranks” (p. 105).  
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While Doerries obviously does not know the specifics of the reactions, immediate or 
delayed, that his audiences bring home (there has not, as yet, been any formal research on the 
effects of Theater of War for veteran audiences), he has found neither of the concerns to be borne 
out—and he has a theory as to why. Like White (2007), Doerries returns to Aristotle’s writings 
on tragedy and catharsis, specifically the idea that tragedies are graphic illustrations of 
“suffering.” By bringing about a collective response in the audience to this suffering, by calling 
forth powerful, shared emotions, a state of catharsis—a cleansed and purified state—is achieved 
(p. 37). Doerries takes issue with the well-worn idea of the “tragic flaw” of characters in Greek 
tragedies, as he sees that eliciting in audiences a feeling of judgment rather than empathy. But it 
is empathy that moves us from one place to another—perhaps from a place of judgment (self or 
other inflicted) to one of understanding.  As Doerries notes,   
tragedies are not designed to teach us morals, but rather to validate our 
moral distress at living in a universe in which many of our actions and 
choices are influenced by external powers far beyond our 
comprehension—such as luck, fate chance, governments, families, 
politics, and genetics. (p. 13) 
Citing the term, allostatic load, which was coined by psychologists at Yale and refers to 
the “physical strain of the body’s stress response…upon the cardiovascular system” (p. 37), 
Doerries also makes the case that perhaps tragedy, with its cathartic release and the emotional 
movement it induces from a state of “pity and fear” (p. 37) to one of purification, was an ancient 
therapeutic system for recalibrating the autonomic nervous system; perhaps tragedy, as he 
argues, is “a powerful tool for positive change, one whose vast and untapped potential for 
propagating healthy responses to stress remains wholly underestimated” (p. 38).   
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 And I would venture further that there might be a metric explanation, a connection, for 
example, between the rhythms of our nervous system and the rhythms of verse. As the poet 
Robert Wallace (1987) observes,  
Why do we live in square rooms? Why do we draw mechanical doodles when we 
are bored? Why do we tap our feet to music? Perhaps there is a profound link 
between the meter of verse and the human pulse, the rhythm of life itself—te 
TUM te TUM te TUM. The rhythmical impulse runs deep in us. (Wallace, 1987, p. 
8) 
 
Theater of War and Narrative Practice 
It is evident to me that Theater of War is therapeutically beneficial because it hinges, 
consciously or unconsciously, on so many of the basic foundations of White’s (2007) narrative 
theory and practice: exposure and therefore externalization of dominant, pathologizing discourse; 
re-authoring in the form of the rich story development of preferred narratives by the soldier and 
veteran audience; re-membering (Ajax and Philoctetes join the membership of veteran’s lives); 
and, of course, definitional ceremonies. Here the overlaps are striking. For example, Doerries’ 
structure for the performances is essentially identical to White’s structure of “1. The telling of 
the significant narrative by the person. 2. The re-telling of the narrative by those invited to be 
present as outsider witnesses. 3. The retelling of the outsider witnesses’ retelling by the person” 
(White, 2007, p. 185). The only difference is that the figure for whom the ceremony is performed 
is, in Theater of War, first signified by the character at the center of the tragedy, by Ajax, say, 
and then later, in accordance with White’s third step, the central figure is represented by the 
soldier and veteran members of the audience. White’s careful selection of outsider witnesses is 
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echoed in Doerries selection of his panel-Chorus, as well as his dedication to making sure the 
audience is a diverse mix of civilians, i.e. those who need to listen and veterans, i.e. those who 
need to speak.  
The fact that Theater of War is a performance of Greek tragedy and perforce employs the 
ancient technique of catharsis is what enables the audience—the outsider witnesses—to adhere, 
more or less, to White’s “four categories of inquiry” for his outsider witnesses: our focus can’t 
help but be on Ajax’s howling expressions, the linguistically called forth images of bloody 
carcasses, the personal resonances (as a veteran, a spouse, a witness), and on transport. As 
White notes, “It is rarely possible to be an audience to the powerful dramas of other people’s 
lives without this moving us in some way” (p. 191).  
For Litz et al. (2009), one of the most lethal aspects of moral injury is the intractability of 
beliefs about the damaged or ‘flawed’ self that has perpetrated or witnessed profound violations: 
If the attribution about the cause of a transgression is global (i.e., not 
context dependent), internal (i.e. seen as a disposition or character flaw), 
and stable (i.e. enduring; the experience of being tainted), these beliefs 
will cause enduring moral emotions such as shame and anxiety due to 
uncertainty and the expectation of being judged eventually. If these 
aversive emotional and psychological experiences lead to withdrawal (and 
concealment) then the service member is thwarted from corrective and 
repairing experience (that otherwise would temper and counter attributions 
and foster self-forgiveness) with peers, leaders, significant others, faith 
communities, (if applicable), and the culture at large. (p. 700) 
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This intractability is, as Litz et al. (2009) argue in their model for moral repair, precisely why 
soldiers and veterans “need to have an equally intense real-time encounter with a countervailing 
experiencing” (p. 701).   
The definitional ceremony that Theater of War, in fact, is, provides, as I hope I have 
made clear, just such an “intense” and “countervailing” experience. Indeed, it is Theater of 
War’s ability to create a platform for the storying of preferred experience, to offer outsider 
witness retellings, and to temporarily level the hierarchies and boundaries—between generals 
and the enlisted, between veterans and civilians—that works so powerfully against the aspect of 
moral injury that Litz et al. (2009) see as an “over-accommodation . . . of expectations of 
injustice” (p. 701). The resultant co-constructed narrative of shared understanding around the 
burden of war, be that the killing of others or the wish to kill oneself, in place of disavowing, 
dominant narratives about honor, sacrifice, war-induced psychosis or suicidality, is immensely 
validating. As one general succinctly put it after listening to a Theater of War performance, 
Perhaps Sophocles wrote these plays because he was in the minority with 
regard to the compassion he felt for the warriors in his community who 
were struggling with the issues he portrayed in his plays. Perhaps 
Sophocles wrote these plays to comfort the afflicted and afflict the 
comfortable. (Doerries, 2015, p. 108) 
 
And Yet: Examining Moral Injury Through the Lens of Adult-Onset Trauma Theory 
Narrative practice—and by extension Theater of War—is, as I have argued, well-
positioned to address some of the socially embedded wounds of moral injury, the collective and 
individual psychic damage that comes from betrayals of  “social trust” (Shay, 2013, p. 186) and 
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the “shrinking of viable social collaborators” (Farnsworth et al., 2014, p. 255). And yet, the 
whirling dervish of moral injury spins, as Litz et al. (2009) point out, into many areas of 
distress—social, behavioral, spiritual, and psychological—and a multi-modal approach to 
understanding the trauma of this phenomenon is critical.  To that end, I will now turn to 
Boulanger’s (2007) theory of adult onset trauma and to the morally injured figure of Ajax.  By 
providing a close reading of Ajax’s experience, my intent is to both create a visceral, experience-
near understanding of moral injury as a form of adult onset trauma, as well as to demonstrate the 
important clinical implications of Boulanger’s theory. Moral injury shatters social trust; it also, 
certainly, shatters the self, and adult onset trauma theory offers an entry point to the “momentous 
and very private experiences” (Boulanger, 2007, p. 7) of this phenomenon.  
 
The moral injury of Ajax 
At the play’s opening, Athena, goddess of wisdom appears to tell Odysseus how Ajax, 
considered by all to be the strongest of the Greek warriors, has gone insane in the night, and has 
butchered a collection of livestock. Ajax, we learn, was enraged with Odysseus and the other 
Greek leaders because the cherished armor of Achilles had been given to Odysseus rather than to 
him. Ajax considered himself more deserving: not only was he the best warrior, but Achilles was 
also his dear friend. Enraged by this compounded betrayal, he sets out to murder Odysseus. He is 
waylaid by Athena, who blinds him with madness so that he kills the livestock rather then the 
men. Upon awakening the next day from this madness, Ajax is consumed with shame and guilt 
over his bloody deeds and is reduced to alternately catatonic and weeping states. He kills himself 




If one is to go by Litz et al.’s model (2009), which conceives of moral injury as 
“participating in or witnessing inhumane or cruel actions, failing to prevent the immoral acts of 
others, as well as engaging in subtle actions or experiencing reactions that, upon reflection, 
transgress a moral code,” then Ajax, tragically, scores on all fronts. He has participated in 
inhumane actions, he has failed to prevent immoral acts, he has transgressed his own moral code. 
Ajax’s symptomology, from within a moral injury framework, could be said to include:  
1. Aggression and sociopathy: “He attacked the horned beasts, smashing/Their spines, 
then hacking out a circle of carcasses/He thought he had hold of the two sons of Atreus/And was 
slaughtering them with his own hands” (55-58).  
2. Alienation and social withdrawal: “And what now? The gods revile me/That is certain. 
I am despised by the Greeks/And hated by this plain of Troy. Should I go home? Abandon these 
moorings?” (457-60).  
3. Depression: “Now he has been laid low by this evil/He won’t eat or drink or say 
anything (321-322).  
4. Shame: “Look at the valiant man! The brave heart!/The one who unflinchingly faced 
the enemy!/You see the great deeds I have done to harmless beasts?/O, the ridicule runs riot 
against me!” (364-367). 
5. Suicidality:  “I also pray to Hermes/Guide to the Underworld, to help me fall on my 
sword/without a struggle—one quick, sharp thrust” (831-33).  
 
Traumatic Reality 
The “divine madness” by means of which Athena overpowers Ajax and the gruesome 
destruction of the livestock that ensues can be read, as Doerries (2015) points out, as a 
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dramatization of the “psychological damage of war” (p. 93). The classical psychoanalyst Meyer 
Lanksy (1996), who has written extensively about shame, regards Sophocles as “the poet of 
shame” and Ajax’s mental collapse as an instance of “dissociated narcissistic rage that arises 
directly from an experience of shame and results in an escalation of both external and internal 
shame conflicts” (p. 766). His view is a break from previous psychoanalytic readings of the text, 
which emphasized Ajax’s rage as a function of psychosis. 
Boulanger (2007), interestingly, does not explicitly name “shame” in her book, although 
it seems implicit in her description of the experience of catastrophic dissociation: there is a 
global collapse of self, hence the self is globally damaged and unworthy. As she writes, 
“[c]atastrophic experience in adulthood brings each aspect of the core self into question, 
shattering confidence in the invariants that previously formed and informed experience, 
jeopardizing the self that cannot, in fact, be separated from experience” (p. 80).  
From an adult onset trauma theory perspective, Ajax’s bloody rampage, I would argue, 
can be seen as a distillation of catastrophic dissociation in the face of extreme trauma—a 
traumatic trifecta, in this case, of years of combat, the death of Achilles, and the betrayal by the 
Greek generals. It is the moment in which Ajax’s agency, physical cohesion, continuity, and 
affect, the crucial components for a sense of self within this framework, are irreparably damaged. 
Boulanger notes that such dissociation is an “emergent, complex, and evolving process” (p. 79), 
and indeed, in the aftermath of his bloodbath, Ajax is left in a “traumatic reality” (p. 59), in 
Lacan’s gap “entre deux morts” (p. 38). This is an emotionally suffocating, death-in-life in place 
where there is, as Boulanger observes of this state, “an emptiness that cannot be contained or 
defined or reasoned away” (p. 38). Or, as Ajax puts it,    
  Oh! 
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  Darkness is now my only light;  
  The gloom of the Underworld 
  Shines for me. Take me! 
  I have lost the right to look for 
  Any help from gods or men. (393-396) 
Sophocles’ text, with its repetition of Ajax’s carnage (we hear extended gory details three 
times, first from Odysseus, then Athena, and finally Tecmessa) makes manifest this traumatic 
reality: Ajax’s massacre takes place before the play opens, so the text quite literally in this 
repetition, gives us post-traumatic flashbacks, effectively merging form and content. It is an 
illustration, to re-quote Boulanger, who is referencing Winnicott, of “a reality that sticks in the 
psychic craw and cannot be dislodged. The survivor is always choking on the fact of it, always 
fearing a repetition of the breakdown that has already happened” (p. 59). This, I would argue, is 
underscored by the intensity of the descriptions of the slaughter—arguably the most vivid 
sections of the entire play—through the insistent use of action words like “attacked,” 
“smashing,” “hacking,” “slaughtering,” “hurling,” “butchered,” “ripped,” “flogged,” and 
“stinging.” These words attest to what Ajax is doing to the cattle, but they also reflect, perhaps, 
the fragmented, terrifying disarray of his internal state; again, the “emergent, complex, and 
evolving process” of catastrophic dissociation.  
 
Agency, Physical Cohesion, Continuity, and Affectivity Applied 
Ajax’s loss of agency is introduced by Sophocles in the first moment of the play: a 
goddess, an unknowable, mercurial force from above has blinded him with madness, and in a 
split second, Ajax has descended from his secure, renowned identity as a powerful warrior, a 
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man who knows his own mind, into the state of a crazed puppet. He had, as Athena tells us, 
actually reached the doors to Odysseus’s tent with his awareness intact. But then, she says, “I 
held him at the brink of his deadly moment of joy/deluding his eyes with visions of his own 
obsession” (52-53). As Boulanger (2007) notes, dissociation “is not a choice; it is imposed by an 
overwhelmed psyche that is attempting to protect itself from further harm” (p. 82).  
While Ajax himself locates his great shame in his inability to follow through with his 
intent to kill the Greeks, mistaking animals for them, it’s also possible to read his slaughtering of 
the animals as an example of the fundamental inhumanity of war, in which men do indeed, as the 
My Lai massacre and countless other war atrocities attest, kill in states of catastrophic 
dissociation brought on by experiences where they have been brought to the brink of either their 
own or someone else’s annihilation. Rage, as Lansky (1996) implies, especially over the loss of 
comrades, certainly plays a part in this, but it can also be traced back to the amygdala-controlled 
“fight” response that is initiated when the body is in danger. The overwhelmingness of such 
experiences is amplified, after the fact, by waves of helplessness—not least of which is the 
helplessness in attempting to make sense or meaning of the traumatic events and memories. 
Ajax, certainly, is unable to make meaning from his “divine madness,” to fit his former self with 
his current self; after the bloodbath, Tecmessa says, he begged her to tell him “how he had come 
to be in such condition” (314). This exchange takes place offstage, before the action of the play 
has begun, which makes it particularly striking that the first words we hear from Ajax on stage 
speak directly to his shattered sense of agency in a world he once felt in control of. “Why me? 
Why me?” (333) and then two lines later, “Why me? Why me?” and again, fifty lines later: 
“Why me? Why?”  
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 Ajax’s violently dissociative experience during his slaughtering spree is also, of course, 
intertwined with a collapse of his self’s physical cohesion and sense of continuity. Independently 
of his conscious mind, his body registers danger and the neural and chemical signals to fight. His 
body, in other words, was present, but not his mind, and this rupture of the balance between 
psyche and soma, as Boulanger (2007) points out, is a rupture of “the body as psychic container, 
capable of establishing an interior object world inhabited by a benign object and capable of 
recognizing the separateness of others” (p. 87).   
At the same time, Ajax’s sense of continuous selfhood is brutally disrupted: he does not 
know what has happened. The text highlights the difference between his state of madness and his 
state of sanity, as though they exist in different dimensions of time: “Slowly and painfully he 
returned to his senses/And when he saw the carnage under his roof/He grasped his head and 
screamed/Crashing down onto the bloody wreckage/Then just sitting in the slaughter, fists 
clenched/his nails tearing into his hair” (305-10). During the rampage, time stood still; for both 
Ajax and the audience, the experience is frozen intact in time, and cannot be processed into a 
narrative of past, present, or future. Indeed there is no “going on being” (Boulanger, 2007, p. 89) 
for Ajax in the moment of his traumatic rampage—or after. The Chorus pleads with Ajax to 
reclaim continuity: “It happened; nothing can change that now—/But don’t keep suffering the 
pain of the past” (377-78). Ajax cannot: “Where could I run? Where could I ever stay? My 
reputation now lies here/Among these butchered carcasses” (403-06). His sense of a self that 
exists through time, that has a past and a future, has been obliterated, and he is imprisoned in, as 
Boulanger puts it, a “meaningless now” (p. 90).  
 Ajax’s traumatized affect is evident in the disembodied quality that overtakes him during 
the massacre. Indeed, as Boulanger notes, it is often the case that “powerful affect triggers the 
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dissociative response” (p. 90) and Ajax’s profound feeling of betrayal and rage at his 
dishonoring by the Greek leaders, certainly propel his actions.  Both during and after the 
traumatic slaughtering, it is clear that he has lost the usual range of familiar feelings that ground 
his core sense of himself. As the Chorus observes, “The mighty warrior/Ares sent out to 
war/Retreats into lonely despair,/Greatly distressing his friends/Everything he reached for/All his 
great glories, lost” (611-17). Tecmessa too is shocked by Ajax’s weeping presentation—and his 
inability to locate his former self:  
I told him what I knew 
And he let out such pitiable, mournful cries— 
Sounds I had never thought possible from him  
He had always thought weeping cowardly, 
A sign of weakness in lesser men. 
Before, he would never wail or cry 
But deeply groan and bellow like a bull.  
Now he has been laid low by this evil. (315-21).  
As with loss of agency, physical cohesion, and continuity, loss of affect regulation 
implies a loss of subjectivity; without an “I,” with nothing but a “self that exists only as an 
object,” the “subject who makes choices and follows through on them is lost” (Boulanger, 2007, 
p. 81). Perhaps this loss of subjectivity also explains Ajax’s repeated, desperate cry of “Why 
me?”, as though in saying me over and over again he might actually come to feel a sense of me.  
The inability to register one’s own affect, too control one’s own affect, or to “experience 
feelings in a consistent fashion” (p. 93) destroys not only a sense of an “I” but a sense of an other 
as well: “With the failure to register one’s own feelings comes both the inability to share one’s 
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affective state with an other, and the failure to appreciate the other’s affectivity, which is the 
basis of intersubjective experience” (p. 93). In the case of Ajax, we see this rupture between self 
and other play out with his wife, Tecmessa, as he urges her to “Get out of my sight! Get 
away!/Aiai! Aiai!” (369-70).   
But I would argue that this rupture of a capacity for intersubjectivity began earlier, before 
the massacre of livestock, which simply compounded it. For Ajax the death of the “good object” 
of Achilles, and then Achilles’ second death, symbolized by Ajax’s loss of his armor, is the 
tipping point.  Sophocles does not describe Ajax’s grief around Achilles’ actual death, but we 
can infer how devastating it is from his extreme response to the armor being given to Odysseus. 
There is obviously the question of honor and respect—and by extension the brutal negation, the 
betrayal of not being honored. But perhaps the significance of the armor for Ajax also lies in its 
ability to keep the good object of Achilles, the internalized empathic other, with him; he would 
have worn the armor, and like a layer of skin it would have served to preserve physical cohesion, 
the integrity of inside and outside, the internal and the external. Without it, Ajax experiences 
profound depersonalization, and as Boulanger notes, “[w]hen the significance of external objects 
is suddenly voided, the internal object world becomes a void” (p. 99). Empathy for the other—an 
ability to hold onto the presence of Achilles or of Tecmessa’s and his son’s love—is unattainable 
in this state. The betrayal of the Greek generals—what Ajax emotionally registers as a desire to 
destroy him—further corrupts his sense of internalized benign others. He is reduced to the 
attacked, reactionary object rather than a reflective subject, and is thus left in Klein’s (1935, 
1986) paranoid schizoid position. From this point of view, the slaughtering of the animals, not to 
mention the repetition of words like hacking and butchering, can also be read as representations 
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of Ajax’s internal landscape, a world filled with persecutory part objects. As Boulanger says of 
the paranoid schizoid position brought on by trauma,  
In this world, [he] has no subjectivity, no agency, and no sense of history; object 
use and mutuality suddenly seem beyond reach, a vague memory of something 
lost, while others, who once felt important to [him] now feel like shadows with no 
substance of their own. (p. 101) 
Ajax is thrust into a state of traumatic aloneness, and indeed, the only thread of hope that 
Sophocles holds out for his survival, hinges on interrupting that aloneness, on staying in the 
company of his family and friends. The Messenger reports back a prophecy given to Ajax’s half 
brother, Teucer: “if he ever wanted to see/Ajax alive again, he must do everything /In his power 
to keep him inside today” (773-75).  (As a side note, it is astonishing to see that Sophocles, over 
two thousand years ago, was already offering a version of the treatment planning around 
suicidality that is still in effect today. Again, to draw on my experience as an intern at the VA, 
although this is true in any crisis of suicidality, when a veteran voiced suicidality, one of the 
most crucial next steps for the mental health workers was to shore up the veteran’s support 
system, to counter, in effect, that traumatic aloneness.)  
But Ajax, of course, cannot be kept inside. He remains in a state of psychic equivalence, 
whereby his self, shattered as it is, can no longer truly reflect, integrate experience, or recognize 
others. “In this state,” as Boulanger notes, “the self that acts as mediator between words and 
what they stand for, between symbols and symbolized, between immediate and mediated 
experience, is no longer accessible” (p. 117). His narrative of experience is lifeless; it is one of 
deadened repetition, evinced by both the repeated scenes of the slaughter and by his repeated 
narrative of vengeance. Neither has been detoxified in any measure for him because of his state 
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of traumatic aloneness. The persecutory part objects that speak to his shattered subjectivity 
reappear in the form of the Furies he calls out to moments before he kills himself: “Come, 
Furies, to a feast of vengeance—Feed on the whole army; devour them all!” (844-45). He is 
calling to them to destroy his enemies, but of course he has not truly projected them outward; 
they are introjected inward and it is it is he who is about to be destroyed:  
  This plain of Troy, you nurtured me, 
  And now I take my leave of you.  
  These are the last words of Ajax;  
  Now he speaks in Hades to the dead. (862-865) 
Ajax’s moral injury, his shattered self, his suicidality are appallingly resonant with the 
experiences of contemporary service members and veterans. Near the end of the play, Menelaus, 
a Greek general observes, “And any man, however great he grows/Can always be felled by the 
slightest blow” (1078-79). This, too, is Boulanger’s refrain about the fragility of the self in the 
face of massive trauma, and it is the refrain of the New York Times feature story that I mentioned 
at the outset of this thesis, which highlighted marine after marine who had been considered to be 
a “fearsome team leader” or who had returned to the States and been a tireless supporter for 
fellow veterans in trouble, ultimately succumbing to suicide. In the article, one of the soldiers, 
Travis Wilkerson, implores the others to maintain solidarity and safety. After the funeral of a 
platoon member who had committed suicide, he says to his company buddies, “Real talk, guys, 
let’s make a pact, right here . . . I don’t want to go to any more funerals. Let’s promise to reach 
out and talk. Get your phones out, put my number in.  Call me day or night” (Philipps, 2015). 
Two years later Wilkerson shot himself to death.  
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Recognizing this breaking point—the basic shatterability of the human self, no matter 
how strongly constructed it once was—is the springboard for Boulanger’s adult onset trauma 
theory, and is why she sees it as imperative that mental health workers understand the particular 
process of catastrophic dissociation in adulthood and the specifics of the ensuing psychic 
wreckage. In the same article, one man perfectly describes catastrophic dissociation, albeit in his 
own words: 
“Something happens over there,” said Mr. Havniear, whose best friend from the 
battalion tried suicide by cutting his wrists after returning home, but survived. 
“You wake up a primal part of your brain you are not supposed to listen to, and it 
becomes a part of you. I shot an old woman. I shot her on purpose because she 
was running at us with an RPG. You see someone blown in half, or you carry a 
foot. You can try, but it is hard to get away from that.” (Philipps, 2015) 
Boulanger argues that without recognizing how this mode of dissociation differs from 
developmental trauma, without according value to Lacan’s Real—the severed foot in your 
hand—and without finally privileging narrative over interpretation as a pathway to healing, 
treatments will dead-end and narratives, like Ajax’s—or Mr. Havniear’s—will remain lifeless. 
The subject will not be found.  
 
Strengths and Limitations 
 Moral injury, as it is currently being constructed, is a complex phenomenon that has 
implications for veterans on both a societal and personal level. The combined application of 
White’s narrative theory and practice and Boulanger’s adult onset trauma theory offer social 
workers a way to attend to both the socio-cultural and psychodynamic components of moral 
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injury. As far as I know, this thesis is unique in its application of these two theories to the public 
health project, Theater of War, and to the text of Sophocles’ Ajax.  
 However, there are limitations to this thesis. I have not applied other theoretical 
constructs like betrayal trauma theory or emotional processing theory, attachment theory, or 
neurobiology, all of which would have offered compelling lenses and provided additional 
understanding of the phenomenon of moral injury. My theoretical lenses are also constrained by 
the fact that I have looked at them exclusively through their founding authors—Michael White 
and Ghislaine Boulanger. Boulanger, as far I can tell, is the only person who is calling her theory 
adult onset trauma, and the only one making her particular distinctions about catastrophic 
dissociation, but with regard to narrative practice, I have not branched out to include the 
theorizing of the many other writers and practitioners who engage in this framework. I have also 
chosen to illustrate the social and psychodynamic devastations of moral injury primarily 
(although not exclusively) through fictional texts, rather than through first hand oral testimonies.  
 This thesis is also hampered by my personal limitations, primarily the fact that I am a 
civilian and do not have family members or friends who are in the military. I write from a 
position of tremendous privilege with regard to veterans and moral injury: my social class, my 
race, and my gender have all protected me from war experiences, both in terms of actual 
enlistment as well as in terms of social engagement with veteran causes. I did not grasp the 
severity of the trauma that veterans experience until a year ago, when I was an intern at the 
Department of Veterans Affairs. I have therefore lived many years contributing to moral injury 





The current moral injury construct is for me, in the end, a signifier of an acute 
understanding of the catastrophic trauma of war. It is an important step in increasing the 
visibility of war trauma for social workers, for other mental health workers, and for civilians, and 
for forcing all of those who have not engaged in our recent wars to look more closely at the 
shattering psychological impact of killing other human beings—and to look, as well, at the 
shattering psychological impact of not recognizing the shattering psychological impact of killing 
other human beings. Betrayal, as moral injury illustrates, can take many forms.  
I have no illusion that either narrative practice or adult onset trauma theory offer easy 
fixes for something that, ultimately, can never be entirely fixed. But both seem, as I hope I have 
demonstrated, to be frameworks that, in their privileging of narrative, fervently wish to restore a 
measure of richness and meaning to daily experience, even for those who have been near-
decimated by annihilation—theirs or someone else’s. Social workers need to attend to both 
components, to work to create more venues for the communalization of war, as Theater of War 
does so effectively, as well as to comprehend the depths of psychic shattering that occurs, and 
the long, slow work of rebuilding a self through therapy that recognizes the particularities of 
adult onset trauma.   
“Absorbing, mysterious, of infinite richness, this life,” writes Virginia Woolf in Mrs. 
Dalloway (1925). Throughout her novel she holds that sentiment in a dialogic balance with the 
equally true observation, made by Septimus Warren Smith, the suicidal combat veteran, that 
“human nature is remorseless” (p. 98). Such is the balance that social workers—that all of us— 
must reconcile when attending to moral injury. In our interactions with those who are, like 
Septimus, continually at risk of feeling “as if some horror had almost come to the surface and 
was about to burst into flames” (p. 15), we must stand alongside them as true witnesses to the 
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horror that they have experienced, whether that horror has overtaken them from the inside or has 
surrounded them from the outside, remembering too that the nature of inside and outside, 
personal and communal, in a moral injury context, is porous indeed. We must recognize the 
reality of this horror, of this very particular human narrative, and in so doing refuse to leave 
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